

# LECTURES

BY THE

## *Rev. Jos. Cook.*

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LECTURES BY THE  
REV. JOSEPH COOK.

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I.

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UNE XPLOR E D R E M A I N D E R S I N C O N S C I E N C E.

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WHEN Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the poet, was a poor boy and a charity scholar in London, he was one day walking along the Strand, at an hour when the place was crowded, and was throwing out his arms vigorously toward the right and the left. One of his hands came in contact with a gentleman's waist-coat pocket, and the man immediately accused the boy of thievish intentions. "No," said Coleridge, "I am not intending to pick your pocket. I am swimming the Hellespont. This morning in school I read the story of Hero and Leander, and am now imitating the latter as he swims from Asia to Europe." The gentleman was so much impressed by the vividness of the imagination of the lad that he subscribed for Coleridge's admission to a public library, which began the poet's education. Now the beginning of all clearness on the multiplex topic of Conscience is to make a distinction between picking a pocket and swimming the Hellspont. The external act may be precisely the same, although the inner motives differ by celestial diameters. It is natural to man, however he obtained the capacity, to make a distinction between meaning right and meaning wrong. Not only did this gentleman and the poet boy not stop on the Strand to settle the question whether the intuition or the associational theory in ethics is correct; but the urchin, coasting down the long Mall of Boston Common, would not stop for that purpose, were he struck by some careless coachman with the lash. He would look up and immediately ask: "Did you mean to do that?" And, if he sees that it was the result of accident, he excuses the coachman; but, if he finds that the coachman meant mischief, he accuses him accordingly. Just so the babe that cannot speak, building its card-house on your parlor carpet, will look up when you trample down its castle, and ask, not verbally, but by action, whether you meant to do that. And if it ascertains that you did not, you will be excused; but, if you intended to destroy the work of the babe, that human constitution will react against you. This

babe, building the card-castle, has not been evolved very far in human experience. It has not had a long time in which to develop, by considering questions of utility, a tendency to notice the difference between meaning right and meaning wrong, and to make a distinction between the outward act and the inner motive. However it arises, whether according to the theory of Herbert Spencer or Professor Alexander Bain, and others of their school, whom I imagine sitting yonder on my left, or according to the theory of Kant and Rothe, and their followers, whom I imagine sitting there on my right, we have here and now, as human beings, a tendency to ask whether any one who injures us means to do so or does so accidentally; and according to the motive we judge the external act. In one case it is picking the pocket; in the other it is swimming the Hellespont.

There are two schools represented by these stately auditors of ours, invisible but tangible here; and when I turn to Spencer and Bain on my left I find conscience called fallible, educable, vacillating. John Foster, in a celebrated essay, says that there is not among human spiritual possessions anything so absurd and chimerical as conscience. It is a bundle of habits. Pascal affirms that "conscience is one thing north of the Pyrenees, and another south." We have a fifth listener here, Dean Mansel, a pupil of Sir William Hamilton, and who built on the only boggy acre of his master's generally sound territories. Even he asks incredulously how conscience obtains the right to rule the other faculties.—(Mansel, "Limits of Religious Thought.") But, if I turn to Immanuel Kant, I find him uttering the amazing proposition that an "erring conscience is a chimera." There is no such thing.—(Kant, "Metaphysics of Ethics, 3rd ed., p. 217.) I ask Rothe, yonder, what he thinks of that statement; and he bows assent to the whole of it.—(Rothe, "Theol. Ethics," ii, 29.) I cross the German Sea to Scotland, and enter the parlor of Professor Calderwood, teacher of ethics in the University at Edinburgh, where Sir William Hamilton taught, and that scholar is putting Kant's proposition that an erring conscience is a chimera into the foreground of his best work,—("Hand-book of Moral Philosophy," p. 81.) Stuart Mill sits over there, and Rothe, over here, looks Stuart Mill in the eyes; and, as I gaze into their faces, I do not find that Rothe and Kant are as likely to be looked out of countenance as Mill and Spencer.

Nevertheless, there must be some way of explaining the difference between these honest men. We have the same debates among ourselves. We are accustomed to affirm that conscience has something divine in it. And that which is divine does not mislead us. Does it? But we say also that conscience is not infallible. It is erring. The Bible itself speaks of conscience as seared, blunted and blinded. We have Scriptural warrant for saying that the conscience may be seared as with a hot iron. And yet the Bible does speak of a Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world and that in the beginning was with God and was God. Can that be seared with a hot iron? Can God be blinded? Plainly, there are two doctrines in the Scriptures on this subject, or, rather, two points of view. These opposing schools are not really stating propositions that contradict each other. They stand at different points

of vision. And so the different popular ideas concerning conscience are apparently self-contradictions, because we do not notice that they are taken up from opposing outlooks.

Whenever you find yourself in a mental fog, attend to the duty of definition.

What is conscience? It was my fortune to spend the first three months after the close of three years' theological study, alone on Andover hill, with the use there of the best theological library in New England. I had had some instruction in religious science; but when I asked myself what I meant by conscience, it was impossible for me to give a distinct definition. I had been authorized to teach, such as were foolish enough to listen, a few propositions concerning religious truth; but I could not define conscience. I set myself to work, and it was nine days before any adequate light dawned upon that point. What I am now to put before you I have often tested by putting it before scholars, and I do not know that a single syllable has ever been objected to. Nevertheless, I ask no man to adopt my theory of the moral sense. I am speaking here, as always, not to scholars, and not to teachers of religious science who honor us with their presence, but to the average inquirer; to the person who, thinking for himself, finds that he must, first of all, learn how to think, and that, on many a great topic, he needs to know what has survived in the struggles of scholars with each other, age after age, and to know this from men who have time to examine the record. I report to you what is supposed to be the freshest scholarship on this theme in Germany, in Scotland, and in America.

1. Conscience, according to the loose popular idea of it, is the soul's sense of right and wrong.
2. Conscience, according to the strict, scholarly idea of it, is the soul's sense of right and wrong *in motives*.
3. Defined in the loose, popular way, as only the sense of right and wrong, conscience implicitly includes the action of the judgment, as well as of the moral perceptions and feelings.
4. Since judgment is fallible, conscience, defined as a spiritual multiplex, including judgment, is fallible, and may justly be spoken of as often blinded, erring, and seared.
5. The loose popular definition makes no explicit distinction between the outer act and the inner motive.
6. The conscience, if supposed to be the compound of faculties which we decide on what is called the rightness or wrongness of external acts, is doubly fallible, and may, with scientific justice, be pronounced erring, vacillating, and often self-contradictory.
7. On the other hand, if conscience be defined in the strict, scholarly way, as the soul's sense of right and wrong in motives, the judgment or purely intellectual activity of the soul is distinguished from the moral perception and feelings; and, therefore, in this definition, does not constitute a fallible factor in conscience.
8. A man does infallibly know whether he means right or wrong in any deliberate choice.

9. If, therefore, conscience be supposed to be, as the strict definition describes it, the soul's sense of right and wrong in motives, and in those only, conscience is infallible within its field.

10. In this sense and in that field conscience is not educable.

11. It follows from this definition that right and wrong belong only to motives, and that external acts, taken wholly apart from their motives, have only expediency or inexpediency, usefulness or harmfulness ; and that their character in these respects is ascertained by the judgment, and not by the conscience.

12. But conscience not only perceives the difference between a good motive and a bad. It feels that the good motive ought and that the bad ought not to be chosen.

13. Conscience, therefore, may be briefly and provisionally defined as a sense, including both a perception and a feeling—*a perception of right and wrong in motives ; and a feeling that right ought and wrong ought not to be chosen by the will.* Every motive has two sides—rightness or its opposite, oroughtness or its opposite. The former distinction is perceived, the latter felt. *Conscience is that which perceives and feels rightness and oughtness in motives.*

Such is the definition with which we set out on a course of thought in which it is hoped there may be discussed John Stuart Mill's views, Herbert Spencer's, Matthew Arnold's, and Mr. Emerson's, as well as Kant's and Rothe's and Butler's, or the entire conflict between the development and the intuition, and between the latter and the pantheistic theory, concerning the loftiest of the faculties possessed by man. At the close of the enlargements and verifications of these propositions which are to come in subsequent lectures there will be inferences of a sort which I hope will do something to blanch the cheeks of unscientific thoughtlessness. Everywhere we are to proceed according to the principles of inductive science. We are to ask : What are the facts in man's inmost life, and what relations to the nature of things ? We are to infer from incontroverted facts concerning the moral sense what its nature is. We are to judge it by its effects. I am not asking you, in anything I have thus put before you, to accept Mill's theory or Rothe's, Herbert Spencer's or Kant's. I am asserting here and now only that a distinction is to be made between external acts and inner motives, and that the peculiar prerogative of conscience is to tell us what is right or wrong within the sphere of intention.

You notice that I have admitted the propriety of all our popular and, of course, of all the scriptural language concerning the possibility that the conscience may be seared with a hot iron ; but I insist also that there is in us an original capacity to judge of the difference between right and wrong intentions, and that just as we see that the whole is greater than a part we see that meaning right is something different from meaning wrong.

There are ethical axioms, as there are mathematical axioms ; and, if exact research establishes axioms in ethics, you will know how to build on them after the pattern shown in the Mount that burneth yet as with fire, and that cannot

be touched, and which, if we could see it in its unexplored remainders, we should ask to have screened from us, for no man ever passed forty days and forty nights there without coming down with such a glory on his face as to need a veil.

In spite of the distinctions which I have indicated, you say that it is not clear that judgment is not concerned in determining whether a motive is right or wrong. When I was in Syria, I saw many strange fruits, and would occasionally pluck down a pomegranate and look at it, weigh it in my hand, notice its subtle fragrance, and finally taste it. Now, no doubt the intellectual faculties do pluck down motives from the tree Igdrasil, and no doubt we stand as lawyers before the court of conscience and make pleas—often very mischievous ones. It is beyond controversy that the judgment is a fallible faculty, and that I do weigh the Igdrasil pomegranate in that intellectual hand, and that it does bring the fruit to the lips ; but it is only the tongue that tastes the pomegranate. By an intellectual act we bring the motive clearly before conscience, and conscience perceives its flavour. It is not the fingers that taste the strange fruit. The eyes know nothing of the flavour. There is no sense possessed by man by which the flavour of the pomegranate can be ascertained except that which rests in the tongue. Without the sense of taste there is no perception of flavours ; without conscience there is no perception of the difference between right and wrong. Neither in the former nor in the latter case can perception be acquired. A being without conscience, however highly endowed intellectually, cannot be taught to feel the distinction between what ought to be and what ought not to be. We do not reason with the Corliss engine, to teach it that it should plunge its pistons regularly. As it feels and knows nothing of moral distinctions, so we can imagine a being possessed of the intellectual equipment of the Aristotles and Bacons, or the executive ability of the Napoleons and Cæsars, and yet without a perception of the difference between right and wrong. *We can picture to ourselves a creature possessed of that perception, and yet without any feeling, when right has been seen, that it ought to be followed ; but neither popular nor scientific language would permit us to say that such a being has a conscience.* This crucial fact shows that the moral sense must be made to include both a perception and a feeling. But the latter may be weak and conscience yet exist.

I define conscience as that within us which not only perceives what is right in motives, but also feels that what is right ought to be chosen by the will. You may be puzzled by the question whether conscience is not sometimes inoperative or dead. I know that this *feeling* that what is right ought to be followed may have greater or less force. But the *perception* that there is a distinction between right and wrong in motives, or between meaning to do well and meaning to do ill, I hold is clear in every man down to the limits of sanity ; and, that, although the magnetic needle may not always be followed, although the crew may be crazy and not look at the card, there is in the needle a power that makes it point to the north whenever it is balanced on a hair-point and allowed to move without fetters. We are so made that the distinction between right

and wrong in motives is as evident to us in the sphere of moral action as the superiority in size of a whole over a part is in the sphere of mathematics. In the region of ethics it is axiomatic truth that religious science insists upon, just as in the region of mathematics it is axiomatic truth that mathematical science insists upon. I beg Mr. Mill's pardon. I am not using the word intuitive, which he dislikes and which Kant honors. Here and now I insist on nothing more than the proposition that self-evident truths are the basis of mathematics and that self-evident truths are the basis of ethics, and that we perceive all such truths directly. They are matters of supreme certainty. There is a difference between the right hand and the left in the soul's choices among motives, and men are as sure concerning that as they are concerning the proposition that every change must have an adequate cause. Distinguish, then, between the fingers that pluck down the fruit, or the intellectual faculties that discuss motives, and the moral sense that tastes them. I may almost define conscience as the tongue that tastes the flavour of intentions.

The chief advances of science have come from the study of unexplored remainders. We have in conscience a perception of the distinction between right and wrong. But what lies behind that perception? The difference exists in the nature of things, apparently. But what lies behind the nature of things? There is in conscience a feeling that we ought to follow what we perceive to be a right motive, and ought not to follow what we perceive to be a bad one. But what lies behind the terrific weight of the word *ought*?

Take the single syllable *ought* and weigh it, my surprisingly skeptical friends, and do so according to the sternest rules of the scientific method. How are we to ascertain what this word weighs unless it be by experiment? What experiment shall we try with it, if it be not that of weighing over against it something very heavy? What shall we weigh against the one word *ought*? Here is a soldier with an empty sleeve. There was a day when the question arose whether he ought to go to the front in the war. He had to maintain father and mother; and the word *home* is supposed to be a very weighty one. Heavier than the word *father* or *mother* is the word *wife*. He weighed that word, and the others with it, against the word *ought*, and *father* and *mother* and *wife* went up in the scale, and *ought* went down, and he went to the front. Is *ought* scientifically known to weigh anything? Here is another soldier who had *father*, *mother*, *wife*, and *children* to weigh against that insignificant syllable; and he weighed them, in the mornings and the noons—in both the sacred twilights, as they say in India—and in the midnights. *Father*, *mother*, *wife*, and *children* were words to which he allowed their full weight. He was the only support of his family; but the one word *ought* again and again carried up the weight of these weightiest contradicting syllables. What if this soldier and that could have put into the left-hand scale all that men value in wealth and honor, or reputation? I will not suppose the word *honor* to have any other meaning than reputation, for I cannot weigh *ought* against *ought*, and a man *ought* to maintain his *honor*. We must not be so unscientific as to weigh a thing against itself. But we put in here outward standing among men and wealth

and life. If you please, sum up the globes as so much silver and the suns as so much gold, and cast the hosts of Heaven as diamonds on a necklace into one scale, and if there is not in it any part of the word ought—if ought is absent in the one scale and present in the other—up will go your scale laden with the universe, as a crackling paper scroll is carried aloft in a conflagration, ascending toward the stars. Is it not both a curious and an appalling fact, this weight of the word ought, and yet a fact absolutely undeniable? Where is the materialist or the pantheist who dares assert that I am making the syllable too heavy? You may weigh against that word everything but God, and it will outweigh all but himself. I cannot imagine God weighed against ought. Precisely here is the explanation of a mystery. God is in that word ought, and therefore it outweighs all but God. There is your first unexplored remainder.

But, my friends, we must be analytical, in order to be brief. Conscience includes :

1. A direct perception of the difference between right and wrong in motives.
2. A feeling that what's right in motives ought to be and what is wrong in motives ought not to be chosen by the will.
3. A sense of one's own approval or disapproval, according as to what ought to be is or is not chosen.
4. A sense of an approval or disapproval from a Divine Somewhat and Someone not ourselves, according as we choose good or bad motives.
5. A bliss or a pain, each capable of being, at its height, the acutest known to the soul; the former arising when what ought to be has been done, and the latter when what ought not, and the two alternating or acquiring final permanence according to our approval or disapproval of ourselves and our feeling of our approval or disapproval by a Divine Somewhat and Someone not ourselves alternate or acquire final permanence.
6. A prophetic anticipation that both our approval and disapproval, by ourselves and by a Divine Somewhat and Someone not ourselves, are to continue beyond death and to have consequences affecting us there as personal existences.

In these six propositions I have ventured to summarize the definition of conscience. I shall hereafter enlarge and defend them one by one; but here and now I use them only in the outline which this lecture is intended to draw in bold contours, and leave you to take the point of view of practical philosophy, without asking you to decide to-day between the Mills and the Spencers on the one hand, and the Kants and the Rothes, on the other. These two sets of listeners will endorse these propositions as statements true to human nature. There is within us the power of perceiving the difference between right and wrong in motives. We have a feeling that the right ought to be followed and that the wrong ought not to be. We have a sense of approval or of disapproval of ourselves. Our instincts assures us that there is an approval or disapproval above our own. We have a bliss or pain, according as we feel this approval or disapproval from ourselves and from Somewhat or Someone not ourselves. Lastly, there is in conscience a prophetic office, by which we anticipate that

consequences closely concerning us as conscious personal existences will follow us beyond death.

I defy any student of the literatures of the world, I defy any man who will be faithful to the scientific method in the study of human nature, I defy any candid and clear thinker to deny in the name of inductive science either of these six propositions.

Think of the unexplored remainders beyond each one of the ascertained scientific facts concerning conscience. Where is the seat of that Authority which speaks in the mysterious but wholly undeniable weight of the word ought? Where now is He who is the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world, and that in the beginning was with God and was God? There are men who do not perceive the absolutely unfathomable glory of Christianity, either as a philosophy or as a life, and who ask vaguely where He is who spoke once as never man spake and since has governed the centuries? Where now is He whose pierced right hand lifted heathenism off its hinges and turned into another channel the dolorous and accursed ages? To me, too, on humble and struggling paths in the valleys of thought, as well as to your Dean Stanleys and your Rothes, aloft there where the sky-kissed peaks of research gaze upon the coming sun, the sublimest, as well as the most organizing and redemptive truth of exact ethical science is the identity of the Moral Law and the Divine Nature. Wherever the Moral Law acts, there Christianity finds the personal Omnipresence of Him whom we dare not name—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—Creator—Redeemer—Sanctifier—One God, who was and is and is to come. At this miraculous hour, the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world is, not was. It is scientifically known that this Light has its temple in conscience. But it has been proclaimed for ages by Christianity that God is one, and that Our Lord is as personally present in every breath of the Holy Spirit in the latest days as he was in that breath which he breathed on His Disciples when He said: “Receive ye the Holy Ghost.” Our cheeks may well grow white and the blood of the ages leap with new inspiration when, standing between Christianity and science, we find the thunders of the one and the whispers of the other uttering the same truth. It is a familiar doctrine to Christianity that our bodies are the temple of Somewhat and Someone not ourselves. That Someone Christianity does, although physical science does not, know by an incommunicable Name. There are connections between religion and science here of the most overawing moment, and in the whole field of the truth concerning conscience they are the vastest unexplored remainder.



II.

S O L A R   S E L F - C U L T U R E .

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DANTE, describing the angels whom he met in the Paradiso, impresses us at once with their external glory and their spiritual effulgence. Invariably he makes the former a result of the latter. With closer faithfulness to physical science than he dreamed and building better than he knew, he sings:

“Another of those splendors  
Approached me, and its will to pleasure me  
It signified by brightening outwardly,  
As one delighted to do good ;  
Became a thing transcendent in my sight,  
As a fine ruby smitten by the sun.”

—“*Paradiso*,” *Canto ix.* 13-69.

Dante says of Beatrice, as he saw her in the Paradiso, that

“She smiled so joyously  
That God seemed in her countenance to rejoice.”

—“*Paradiso*,” *Canto xxvii.* 105.

Allow me to adopt this last line of Dante's, and all it suggests, as a description of what I mean by solar light in the face of man. This radiance ought to be by us, as it is by natural law, most searchingly distinguished from all lesser illuminations. *Its specific difference from every other light is that in it God seems to overawe beholders and to rejoice.* It is scientifically incontrovertible that there is sometimes seen such a light in the present world. Many a poet and seer and martyr and reformer and woman of the finest fibre has at times had a face that has looked like porcelain with a light behind it. But this is not solar light, unless it have in it that specific overawing difference which Dante names. It is to be distinguished by that difference from merely æsthetic or intellectual luminousness in the countenance. The radiance cannot be counterfeited. It can come into existence only on inexorable conditions. The appearance and disappearance of the solar light in the face of man are governed by fixed natural laws. Is it possible to discover any of them ?

First of all, I ask you to look at the whole topic of solar self-culture through the lenses of the coolest inductive research. Put aside all mysticism. Fasten the attention only on visible facts, as well known to be a part of human experience, as that men walk or breathe ; come down to the granite of scientific method, and let us see what can be proved :

1. There is sometimes in the face a solar look.
2. There is sometimes in the face an earthy look.

3. The former arises from the activity of the higher nature when conscience is supreme.
4. The latter arises from the activity of the lower nature when conscience is not supreme.
5. The earthy look, other things being equal, quails before the solar look.
6. The merely intellectual light in a face quails before the solar light, when other things are equal.
7. Merely æsthetic light, or that arising from the action of the faculties addressed by what is commonly called culture, quails, other things being equal, before the solar light.
8. The light of merely executive force, other things being equal, quails also.
9. The intellectual, the æsthetic, the executive, and all other light combined, quails, other things being equal, before the solar light.
10. It follows, necessarily, that only such self-culture as brings this light to the face can give its possessor all the power possible to man.
11. Only such self-culture can cause the lower forms of culture to stand in awe before it.
12. The only complete and the only victorious self-culture, therefore, is scientifically known to be solar self-culture.

Be Greeks, gentlemen, long enough to believe that every change must have an adequate cause. How is it that this solar, commanding light springs up from within the multiplex whole of our physical organism? Your materialist will say that certain emotions increase the tension of the mechanism of the eye; and that, therefore, external light is more readily reflected by it, and that we have, hence, apparently, a new light in the eye when those emotions are active. But what is to be said of the light that beams from the forehead, and from the cheeks, and seems to be capable of beaming from the whole exterior of our mysterious form? That radiance does beam from the forehead; it does beam from the cheeks; and why might it not, if this capacity of the organism to shine were once put into full action, beam from the whole man? The materialist would say that the particles of matter in the cellular integument are capable of re-arrangement by certain emotions, and that they reflect light better on account of this re-arrangement. But what gives those emotions the power to re-arrange physical particles in any way, and especially in such a way as causes them to reflect light overawingly? It is incontrovertible that a very peculiar commanding light is brought into the face by the activity of the upper faculties in man. We are to explain this light and its effects by studying man as an organic multiplex. The light is there, and you know it is there. We see it. It is a physical fact.

On the other hand, there is an earthy, opaque look. "Oh! ye hapless two," says Carlyle of Charlotte Corday and Jean Paul Marat. "Mutually extinctive, the Beautiful and the Squalid, sleep ye well in the Mother's bosom that bore you both. This was the History of Charlotte Corday; most definite,

most complete ; angelic demoniac ; like a star.”—(“French Revolution,” Vol. II, book vi. chap. 1.) Compare the faces of Charlotte Corday and Marat.

Certain passions give a dark look to the countenance. How do they do that? Is it merely by a re-arrangement of the ultimate atoms of the skin and of the external parts of the eye? The astute materialist admits that certain emotions are accompanied by such displacements of the atoms of which the body is composed as permit the exterior of the countenance to reflect light only imperfectly. How is it that the bad passions thus relax us? Is it incontrovertible that earthly passions give an earthly look to the countenance. The bestial man acquires an opaque and peculiarly repulsive complexion.

When I stood once in the Jewish Wailing-place in Jerusalem, and contrasted the pure blood of the Jew with the coarse blood of the Arab, I had before me, on the one hand, countenances singularly capable of illumination, and, on the other, countenances singularly incapable of it. Say, if you please, that I am going off scientific ground here. I affirm that I have a scientific right to take the monogamistic Jew and the polygamistic Arab, or the Old Testament and the Koran put into flesh and blood by long centuries of experience, and compare them. There are not a few children from some of the best Jewish families on the earth sent to Jerusalem for education, and pure in blood, and, as I was compelled to think, of finer grain than the Italians and the Greeks of the Forum and the Acropolis. But I said : “ You have forgotten the English : you have forgotten the Americans.” And as my thoughts were taking that posture there came into the brown, crowded square two children in English dress, and began to converse with the Jewish children. I said : “ These are sons of rough men, probably. They do not represent the English or the American fineness.” They were superior in animal force ; but plainly inferior in capacity for the solar look, to the Jewish boys with whom they conversed face to face. I asked to whom the outrivaled children belonged, and found they were sons of one of the most cultured men ; indeed, of one of the missionaries in the Holy City. The Arab, however, was the greater contrast—opaque, repulsive, and showing an imperviousness to light in his countenance ; while in the best specimens the Jew shone from behind his physical integument at times like a light behind thin, translucent marble. We know that this contrast exists in different men we meet, and in different moods of the same individual. Men may be made of floss-silk, and have æsthetic luminousness in their faces, and yet no solar light. It is a wholly incontrovertible fact that an earthly look comes from an earthly mood, and a solar look from a conscientious.

But now, will any one who reveres the scientific method deny my chief proposition, that the earthly look, other things being equal, quails before the solar? Is not that known to ordinary observation? No doubt, if a Cæsar or a Napoleon comes before some man of weak will, the latter, although he may be a good man—and especially if he is a goodie, a very different thing—will quail. But give the latter the executive power and the intellect of your Cæsar, and what is the result? *Other things being equal, Cæsar's eye goes*

*down whenever it meets and does not possess the solar look.* The veriest sick girl that has this solar light behind her eyeballs, is more than a match for your Cromwell. Yes, his daughter was a match for him once; and Cæsar's wife for the man whose finger-tap overawed a Roman Senate. There are no forces known to the lights of the eye, that, other things being equal, ever do or can put down the solar light, even in the sick and the weak. Poets have celebrated many lesser radiances, and occasionally this highest radiance that can belong to woman. There are behind it an awe and a sense of command that distinguish it from all other lights.

We know that the brute sees the sunset; but does it feel its pensiveness? No doubt the monsters that tore each other in the early geological ages beheld the risings of the suns, and their descendings, and their noons. The eyes of many a winged creature in the night reflect as perfect images of the stars, as did Newton's. But do they appreciate what we call beauty, or sublimity, or natural law? *The world is a sealed book to the brute; and an archangel would say that it is to us.* On his vision, were he in the world, might fall no more than on ours; but he would read as many more meanings than we, as we than the brute. What is the significance of this mysterious commanding solar light? It is a visible fact; but we gaze on it apparently with brutish, uncomprehending eyes. We do not intellectually fathom it; and yet we feel it much as the brute feels the authority of the human eye.

Your pensive, wailing, inferior creature that gazes into the human face seems very often to be governed by an awe that does not arise from fear of physical injury. There is command in the intellectual light when it is contrasted with the merely animal light. The poor four-footed brute goes away with, it may be, a vague sense of worship, or of affection, at last, if you draw it toward you. The canine creatures can thus be tamed; and untamable beasts can be looked out of countenance—even your lion and your tiger, if you gaze steadily upon them, contrasting the human radiance with the animal. Now, just as that four-footed brute may feel, looking into your eyes, so I confess I have felt sometimes when looking into the eyes of those better than myself. I have felt brutish. I have felt my inferiority. I have quailed—I confess it—before eyes that I thought had behind them a holier light than mine have ever shown. I sometimes contrast my mood at such instants with that of your creature that cannot speak, and that slinks away with a sense of inferiority. I know that that light is my master. I do not quite understand the light. The poor brute does not understand the radiance of the human eyes, but confesses that this light is above it. And so I have felt that in the solar radiance there is something above all my earthiness. There is no man that can look on what we call the solar light in the human countenance, and feel that it is genuine, and not reverence it. There is a natural awe in its presence. What does this incontrovertible fact mean? There are only a few animals so low that they cannot be looked out of countenance; and there are only a few men so low that they cannot be looked out of countenance also.

As the brute sees the sunset and does not understand it, gazes upon the glory and beauty and finds it a sealed book, so perhaps we, in this marvellous capacity of man's countenance to clothe itself in solar light, are looking upon something that in another age will be better understood in the name of science. So much is already uncontestedly known: that the solar light exists; that all other light quails before it; that it springs from the heights of conscience; and that the only complete and the only victorious self-culture must be solar self-culture. Even if we were compelled to pause here, we should have attained a point of vision where, as Goethe said when he climbed Vesuvius, one look backward takes away all the fatigue of the ascent and is a regenerating bath. Our age believes in culture; a more scientific age will believe in solar self-culture. On the height to which our inductive research has now carried us will be erected tabernacles to the honor of the only culture by which, under natural law, the yet opaque face of civilization can find transfiguring and commanding light.

What of the Transfiguration? Was that an example of solar light? The clouds are slowly parting above this theme, and is it possible that we have not yet reached its summit? Is this outlook of ours only from a mountain range so low as to be hardly a vestibule? There is a solar light. And what if, adhering now to all that science proves, we gaze up the Alps, so unexpectedly unveiled, as the vapors part themselves above the stupendous veiled summits of Revelation. Is it possible that their height itself has kept them obscured until we had little knowledge of their existence?

I am asking you here and now only to take scriptural facts as statements of the Christian point of view. If there is any man here who regards the history as mythical, even he will allow me to use it to show what Christianity believes. I am scientifically authorized to make reference to it all to show what has been taught on the topic of the solar radiance.

It is recorded that in an Eastern city a martyr was once tried, and as all they who sat in the council looked steadfastly on him, they beheld his face as it were the face of an angel. Is it possible that the solar light present in this case and in approximately similar cases in our day is the same thing? It is recorded, also, as we remember, now that we allow our minds to sweep through the vistas of historical incidents, that a lawgiver, who yet rules the centuries, once had, as he came down from a certain mount, a face that shone. The old Greek used to inquire with intensest philosophical interest what that light was which appeared once, not in the face only, but in the hands and in the feet and in the garments of the only Member of the human race that ever has shown us solar light at its best. The Greek asked in the early days of Christianity: Whence that light? There is incontrovertibly a solar light which fills the faces of a few men and women in our day. Dante, I take it, is looking toward this fact when he says: "That which in Heaven is flame on earth is smoke." Is it possible that the solar look which comes into the countenance whenever the loftier zones of feeling are in full action is of the same sort with that which appeared in the face of Dante's Beatrice, delighted to do good;

and in the face of Him whose countenance was like that of an angel ; and in the face of Moses ; and in the unfathomed symbolisms of the Transfiguration? Is it of the same sort with that light which fills the world of those who have no need of the sun, because the face of the Lamb doth lighten them and the glory of God is the lamp of their tabernacle ?

These questions may well blanch the cheeks ; but they are to be studied in the spirit of science, if we are to think with any freedom or breadth. Surely, here is a train of investigation not often followed in detail. Having read to you twelve propositions drawn up from the point of view of science, let me read twelve drawn up from the point of view of unadulterated Christianity.

1. It is historically known that the early Christians regarded the possession of the solar commanding look as a sign of the possession of the Holy Spirit. Stephen, when full of the Holy Ghost, had a face like that of an angel. When Moses came down from the mount, his face shone.

2. At the Transfiguration this solar light had its supreme manifestation.

3. That light was, perhaps, a revelation of the capacities of the ethereal enswathment of the soul or spiritual body.

To those who were present at the Transfiguration the Cross did not seem other than the voluntary humiliation of Him who was stretched upon it. A revelation of some of the capacities of the spiritual body, which death, according to Ulrici, separates from the flesh, was made to three of the disciples, and they were the three who afterward witnessed the agony in the Garden and were nearest to the Crucifixion. They were prepared for the witnessing of the agony by the previous revelation of the glory of the body which was transfigured.

There was a cloud which appeared in the Transfiguration, and it is recorded that the disciples feared as they entered into that cloud. It is said, also, that when He who was transfigured walked once up the slope from Jordan to Bethlehem the disciples followed him and were afraid. The light which appeared in the Transfiguration appeared again in the Ascension, and the cloud that overshadowed the former was the chariot of the latter.

We have considered here the schemes of thought which assert that there may be three things in the universe, and not merely two—matter and mind, and a middle somewhat, ordinarily called the ether, and, at least, not atomic, as what we call matter is. We know how Ulrici and others speak of an ethereal enswathment of the soul or a spiritual body.

What if the cloud which appeared at the Transfiguration was some revelation to the human sense of that ether which Richter calls the home of souls ? What if the transfiguring light was but a revelation of the capacities of the spiritual body, enswathed within the flesh as light is enswathed within the fleecy tabernacle of the translucent flying clouds in the noon yonder above our heads ? Mysterious, you say ? But, after all, we must adhere to the principle that every change must have an adequate cause. As Dante says, there is smoke on earth. The solar light in the spiritual body is dim here. But what is this flame, when at its best ? The light of the fire that shines in the eyes of a good man or a woman, how bright would it be if their goodness could be

enlarged to the measure of that of the Soul that never sinned? How would it illuminate then the whole frame? Is there unity of kind between the light that we call the solar look in scientific parlance and the radiance that filled Stephen's face or that of Moses? A spiritual body was concerned in the two cases and its powers are everywhere the same. Was there not a spiritual body concerned in the Transfiguration also? Was not one object of that event to make a revelation of the hidden glory of our Lord's person?

Are we going too far when we say that these topics which interested the old Greeks so passionately are worth looking at as the vestibule to the majestic temple of Conscience? Activity of the upper zones of feeling is what causes the light in our little experience of it. We have but the twilight, a dim scintillation of this radiance. But we know that what little we have of it comes from the innermost holiest of Conscience. Raphael studied the Transfiguration, and his painted conception of it was borne aloft above his funeral bier. Are we not, in the advances of science, obtaining some views of it which his canvas cannot show us?

It is recorded of Our Lord that as he prayed the fashion of his countenance was altered, and his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment became white and glistening, so as no fuller on earth can white them.

4. As our Lord's body was human, this capacity of the ethereal enswathment, or spiritual body of our Lord, must be supposed to be possessed in some degree by every human body.

5. An obscurest form of perhaps the same solar light is yet seen occasionally among men.

6. We know that the light arises from the blissful supremacy of conscience and the activity of all the higher powers of the soul.

7. As the Scriptures make the possession of this light one of the signs of the possession of the Holy Spirit in the scriptural days, we must infer that this light is such a sign in these days.

8. The Innermost Holiest of Conscience in blissful supremacy, is, therefore, known to science, as well as Revelation, as the Temple of the Holy Spirit.

9. But the Holy Spirit was shed forth by Him who was the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world.

10. The modern solar light and that Light are, therefore, identified.

11. But the solar light is scientifically known to be the only commanding light; and, therefore, the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world is scientifically known to be the only commanding light.

12. The only complete and the only victorious self-culture is scientifically known to be solar self-culture; but solar self-culture and Christian self-culture, so far forth as both are solar, are identical; and both are known to science as solar, so far forth as they originate in the Innermost Holiest of Conscience.

Harvard yonder, Matthew Arnold, Stuart Mill, all ranks of modern scholars, believe in culture. But there is only one form of culture that gives supremacy, and that is the form which produces the solar look; and the solar look comes only from the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the

world. It may be incontrovertibly proved by the coolest induction from fixed natural law that the highest culture must be that through which the solar look shines, and that this look is possible only when there exists in the soul glad self-surrender to the Innermost Holiest of Conscience. In that Innermost Holiest, Christianity finds a personal Omnipresence. Culture should believe in the law of the survival of the fittest. Two lights conflict—the earthy and the solar. Your eyes filled with poetic rapture, your loftiest attitudes of merely æsthetic or intellectual culture, quail, other things being equal, before the solar look. Here is a fact of science ; a visible, physical, haughty circumstance of yet unfathomed significance ; an unexplored remainder on which what calls itself culture, and quails, may do well to fasten prolonged attention.

“ Satan dilated stood,  
Like Teneriffe or Atlas unremoved ;  
His stature reached the sky, and on his crest  
Sat Horror plumed. . . .  
The Eternal . . .  
Hung forth in Heaven his golden scales, yet seen  
Betwixt Astrea and the Scorpion sign.  
The fiend looked up, and knew  
His mounted scale aloft : nor more ; but fled  
Murmuring, and with him fled the shades of night.

—MILTON, “*Paradise Lost*,” iv. 985.



### III.

## THE PHYSICAL TANGIBILITY OF THE MORAL LAW.

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AFTER Robespierre had choked the Seine with the vainly whimpering heads sheared away by the guillotine, there came an hour when a death-tumbril containing himself was trundled toward the fatal French axe. Carlyle narrates that the streets were crowded from the Palais de Justice to the Place de la Revolution, the very roofs and ridge-tiles budding forth human curiosity, in strange gladness. The soldiers with their sabres point out Robespierre, as the crowd presses close about the cart. A French mother, remembering what rivers of blood that man's right hand had wrung out of the throat of France, springs on the tumbril, clutching the side of it with one hand, and, waving the other Sibyl-like, exclaims, "Your death intoxicates me with joy." The almost glazed eyes of the would-be suicide Robespierre open. "Scelerat, go down, go down to Hell with the curses of all wives and mothers." A little while after Samson did his work, and a shout raised itself as the head was lifted; a shout, says history, which prolongs itself yet through Europe and down to our day.—(Carlyle, "The French Revolution," Vol. II., Book VIII., Chap. VII.) "Go down to." That word "*down*" will never be understood by us until we contrast it with the "*up*," with which men salute the Gracchi, and the Lafayettes, and the Washingtons, and the Hampdens, and the Phocions, and which prolongs itself mysteriously in history. The word "*down*," once uttered by the ages is rarely reversed; and the word "*up*," once looking haughtily on that word "*down*," very rarely in history changes its countenance.

There appear to be behind these two words inexorable natural laws. Is it possible to discover any of them?

1. Instinctive physical gestures accompany the action of strong feelings.
2. It is a peculiarity of the strongest moral emotions that the general direction of the physical gestures which they prompt is either up or down.
3. By the operation of a fixed natural law of the human organism, we hang the head in shame or acute self-disapproval.
4. By the operation of a fixed natural law, we hold the head erect when conscious of good intentions or acute self-approval.
5. It is a physical fact, demonstrable by the widest induction, that the gestures prompted by the blissful supremacy of conscience have their general direction upward and give the human form a reposeful and commanding attitude.

6. It is a physical fact, demonstrable by the widest induction, that the gestures prompted by the opposite relations to conscience have their general direction downward and give the human form an unrepouseful and more or less groveling attitude.

7. Other things being equal, the latter attitude always quails before the former.

8. By fixed natural law the upward gestures induced by an approving conscience and the activity of the higher faculties are accompanied by a sense of repose, unfettered elasticity, and of a tendency to physical levitation.

9. By a fixed natural law the downward gestures induced by a disapproving conscience are accompanied by a sense of unrest, fettered activity, and of a tendency to delevitation.

10. In some of the most celebrated works of great artists the human form is represented as in a state of physical levitation ; but this is always pictured as accompanied and caused by the blissful supremacy of conscience and of the higher faculties.

11. It will be found, on an examination of personal consciousness, that there is in the artistic sense a feeling that forms exhibiting the blissful supremacy of conscience and of the higher faculties will float, and that forms which do not exhibit these traits will not.

12. So deep is the instinct concerned in the upward gesture produced by an approving, and the downward produced by a disapproving conscience, that history contains large numbers of alleged instances of the physical levitation of the human form in moral trance.

13. Without deciding whether these cases are authentic facts or not, their existence shows the intensity of this instinct and the unfathomed significance of the inexorable natural law which it reveals.

14. In the existence of the instinctive upward and downward physical gestures accompanying the approval and disapproval of conscience natural law reveals the distinction between up and down, higher and lower in moral emotion, and, in doing that, founds an aristocracy, strictly so called, or government by the best, and determines that they shall rule. And these instinctive gestures, occurring according to natural law, are a proclamation of that aristocracy—the only one recognized by Nature, and the only one that will endure.

15. It will be found that all the instances of human experience of the distinction between up and down and higher and lower, as thus defined by observation, may be summarized under a law of moral gravitation proceeding from conscience.

16. Moral gravitation, therefore, is as well known to exist and is as tangible as physical gravitation.

17. But all law in Nature is but the uniform action of an Omnipresent Personal Will.

18. The tangibility of the Moral Law in Conscience is scientifically known, therefore, to be identical with the tangibility of an Omnipresent Personal Will.

19. Moral gravitation is *in* but not *of* the soul.

20. There is, therefore, in man a Somewhat or Someone not of him, and ritually, and in a significant sense, physically, tangible through Conscience.

Ascending that stairway of propositions, I have not asked you to pause to muse on the balustrades; but, assuming that we have gone up the height of ether, let us, now that we stand here, look back and make sure that all our steps were on the adamant. Take no partisan witness, however, in our examination of this case before these learned jurors. You say I am a lawyer making a plea for foregone conclusions. Is William Shakespeare a partisan? Did he know anything of human nature? The heaviness of the soul of a man that has done evil—is that recognized by William Shakespeare?

Imagine that this Temple is Bosworth battlefield. There is the tent of Richmond, and here the tent of Richard. William Shakespeare shall guide us in our study of natural laws in these two tents. He does not look through partisan lenses; he is no theologian. What are these forms that rise in the midnight between the two tents? There are eleven ghosts here. Shakespeare is behind every one of them. They utter nothing that he does not put into their lips; when they speak, he speaks; and some of us have been taught to believe that when Shakespeare speaks, Nature speaks:

“Let me sit *heavy* on thy soul to-morrow!  
Think how thou stabb'dst me in my prime of youth,  
At Tewksbury; despair therefore and die.”

So speaks the first ghost at Richard's tent.

“Be cheerful, Richmond; for the wronged souls  
Of butchered princes fight in thy behalf,  
King Henry's issue, Richmond, comforts thee.”

So speaks the same ghost at Richmond's tent.

“When I was mortal my anointed body  
By thee was punched full of deadly holes,  
Think on the Tower and me; despair and die,  
Harry the Sixth bids thee despair and die.”

So speaks the second ghost at Richard's tent.

“Virtuous and holy, be thou conqueror.”

So speaks the same ghost at Richmond's tent.

“Let me sit *heavy* on thy soul to-morrow,  
I that was washed to death with fulsome wine;  
Poor Clarence, by thy guile betrayed to death!  
To-morrow in the battle think on me,  
And fall thy edgeless sword. Despair and die.”

So speaks the third ghost at Richard's tent.

“Good angels guard thy battle. Live and flourish.”

So speaks the same ghost at Richmond's tent.

“Let me sit *heavy* on thy soul to-morrow.”

So speaks the ghosts of Rivers, Grey, and Vaughan, at Richard's tent.

“ Awake, and think our wrongs in Richard's bosom  
Will conquer him. Awake, and win the day.”

So speaks the same ghosts at Richmond's tent.

The ghost of Hastings rises. The ghosts of the two young Princes rise :

“ Dream on thy cousins smothered in the Tower,  
Let us be lead within thy bosom, Richard;  
And weigh thee down to ruin, shame and death.  
Thy nephews' souls bid thee despair and die,  
Sleep, Richmond, sleep in peace and wake in joy;  
Edward's unhappy sons do bid thee flourish.”

The ghost of Queen Anne rises :

“ Richard, thy wife, that wretched Anne, thy wife—  
That never slept a quiet hour with thee,  
Now fills thy sleep with perturbations.  
To-morrow in the battle think on me,  
And fall thy powerless arm. Despair and die!  
Thou, quiet soul, sleep thou a quiet sleep,  
Dream of success and happy victory;  
Thy adversary's wife doth pray for thee.”

The ghost of Buckingham rises :

“ The first was I that helped thee to the crown ;  
O, in the battle think on Buckingham,  
And die in terror of thy guiltiness.  
God and good angels fight on Richmond's side,  
But Richard fall in height of all his pride.”

The ghosts vanish.

Is this natural, or supernatural, or both, and the one because it is the other ?  
Your Richard wakes yonder in his tent :

“ O coward conscience, how thou dost afflict me !  
The lights burn blue—it is now dead midnight,  
Cold, fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh.  
I am a villain; yet I lie. I am not.  
Fool, of thyself speak well; fool, do not flatter.  
My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,  
And every tongue brings in a several tale,  
And every tale condemns me for a villain.  
Perjury, perjury, in the high'st degree;  
Murder, stern murder, in the dir'st degree;  
All several sins, all us'd in each degree,  
Throng to the bar, crying all: Guilty! guilty!  
I shall despair. There is no creature loves me;  
And, if I die, no soul will pity me.  
Nay, wherefore should they? Since that I myself  
Find in myself no pity to myself.  
Methought the souls of all that I had murdered  
Came to my tent; and every one did threat  
To-morrow's vengeance on the head of Richard !”

—“ *King Richard III.*,” *Act V. Scene III.*

Let me sit heavy on thy soul to-morrow ! So spoke Shakespeare ; so the ghosts ; so inductive science ; so natural law ; so that Somewhat which is behind all natural law ; and so that Someone who is behind the Somewhat.

You will allow me to make reference here to some of the subtlest of unexplored human experiences. I am by no means drifting out of the range of scientific currents and received thought, even if I venture to sail boldly into the fog that lies along the shore of many an undiscovered land. But, my friends, put Shakespeare at the helm. Let us recognize him as the pilot ; and, remembering what weight he puts upon the word *heavy*, dare to look into the canvas of a Raphael and an Angelo a moment ; and into this deeper canvas of our own souls, painted by natural law—that is, by the fingers of the Personal Omnipresence, who was and is and is to come. I affirm, what no man can deny, that natural language is God's language. We did not invent it. Surely natural language is the language of nature ; and these gestures which make us hang the head and give us the erect attitude are proclamations made, not by the will of man, but by the will of that power which has co-ordinated all things and given them harmony with each other, and never causes an instinct to utter a lie. We have heretofore looked carefully into the distinction between an instinct and an educated tendency. It would mean very little if men had been taught to hang their heads in shame. It would mean very little if men by a process of education had learned to assume the erect attitude when conscience is supreme. It is scientifically sure, however, that when an organic instinct can be discovered we have a right to infer from its existence that of its correlate. We know that where there is a fin there is water to match it ; where there is a wing, there is air to match it ; an eye, luminousness to match it ; an ear, sound to match it. The migrating swans fly through the midnights and the morns, and they lean in perfect confidence upon the maker of their instinct, knowing that, if God has given them a tendency to fly to the South, he will have provided a South as a correlate to the tendency. Our great tests of truth are : intuition, instinct, experiment, and syllogism. Incontrovertibly we have instincts concerned, and not educated tendencies, in these instinctive gestures, by which conscience in blissful supremacy gives the human form a commanding or overawing attitude and sometimes a levitated mood. I say that the mood is levitated, whether the form is or not. In certain highest moments, when conscience assures us that the stars fight for us, we do have a feeling that, if cast out unsupported into the ether, we should float there ; and we have at other times a feeling that, if we were disembodied and cast out into the unknown, we should sink. These two subtle and subtly contrasted organic feelings are endlessly significant. Do you believe the forger, the perjurer, the murderer, has any feeling that he could float aloft with the great forms that the artists have put upon canvas ? After studying often at Dresden Raphael's Sistine Madonna, who will float, I paused in the Louvre many times with dissatisfaction before Murillo's Madonna, who will not. She stands on a crescent moon, and I think she needs it as a support. But the Venus di Milo will float, although she is in

marble. We have these instinctive feelings, although we do not understand them any more than the brute does the sunset. We cannot rid ourselves of them if we allow our thoughts and emotions to follow a natural course. We have a strange, deep sense by which we authorize ourselves to say of now and then a female form in art, and even of the male form occasionally, though oftener of the female, that it would float if left alone in the ether. This instinct is an indisputable fact. It is surely a shore, although veiled yet in vapor. We have not approached that coast much yet; but there is the instinct; there is firm land here, and the trend of its beaches, where lies so much undiscovered gold, must be in perfect accordance with that of all these instinctive gestures. Begin with what cannot be controverted, or the proposition that we hang the head in shame and hold it erect in conscious self-approval. We know that some attitudes, in deep remorse, bring a man down to the posture of the brute almost. We grovel in the dust at times, when we feel ourselves under the full thunder and lightning of the moral law. Mr. Emerson says that he has read in Swedenborg (he means he has read in natural law) that the good angels and the bad angels always stand feet to feet; the former perpendicularly up, and the latter perpendicularly down. If you please, that is science; it is not poetry. It is poetry; but it is science, too. We see a gleaming curve of the law in the hanging head and in the erect and reposed and commanding attitude. We see it in that sense of elasticity and almost of physical levitation which arises in states of moral trance. We see it on the canvas of great painters in yet higher manifestations; and when we come to the asserted cases of physical levitation, we have, at least, an indication of the intensity of the instinct they represent, and, therefore, of its value as a scientific guide.

Shakespeare is at the helm. Walk forward into this wheeling vapor and gaze shoreward from the bow of the vessel. Let him keep his place. He will not ground you upon any rocks or shoals. Go to the vexed leeward rail nearest this strange shore, sounding there under this obscuring mist, and open as a chart—what? Why, the *British Quarterly Journal of Science*, edited by Professor Crookes. What does he say? Has he any guide-book to this fascinating unknown coast? He publishes careful articles, in which are summed up a large number of the alleged historical cases of levitation in moral trance. Pliny, in his "Natural History," (vii. 8,) said, long ago, that the bodies of all living things weigh less when alive and awake than sleeping or dead. (*Mares præstare pondere; et defuncta viventibus corpora omnium animantium, et dormientia vigilantibus.*) Dean Trench ("Notes on the Miracles," ed. vii., p. 289,) defines man as "the animal that weighs less when alive and awake than dead or asleep." It is well known that the levitation of the body of Mr. Home in London is asserted on the testimony of eye-witnesses, including in their number Professor Crookes, editor of the *Quarterly Journal of Science*, Lord Lyndhurst, and many other men of large experience, trained minds, full culture, and unimpeached integrity. On a single page of the guide-book to which I have referred you, (*Quarterly Journal of Science*, Jan., 1875, p. 53,) you

will find a statement of the names, country, condition, and date of life of forty levitated persons. "The darker and less historical the age," says this writer, (p. 52), "the more miracles, but the fewer of these phenomena [of levitation]. The testimonies to these, absent, so far as we can see, in the ages from the fourth century to the ninth, increase in number, respectability, and accuracy, from the latter to the present day." In this long list of instances the levitations occur, as a rule, in states of moral elevation or trance. "If levitation has occurred," says this authority, "it is natural. Under what conditions we may never be able in the least to define. But, whatever happens we must call natural, whether the naturalness be clear to few or many, to none or all of us." —(p. 39.) Professor Crookes thinks that, if we can prove that Cæsar was assassinated, we can prove that there have been cases of levitation. I do not believe him. I think it very doubtful whether we can now demonstrate that physical levitation has occurred under the eyes of experts or can be proved to the satisfaction of men of science. But this fully accredited man has a right to be heard in the majestic roar of the unconquered surf of this unknown coast. Shakespeare is there at the helm. He will draw the ship off in a moment. But you must peer once, in the name of science and of more than one advanced pilot of modern thought, into this mist. Professor Crookes affirms that if we are to be candid students of history, we shall be very shy of denying that there never has been physical levitation, as it is sometimes represented on the canvas of our great painters. Personally, he has no doubt that it occurs in states of moral trance.

We know something of what it is to be elastic when we feel right with God and man ; and that fact is a deep glimpse into this wheeling, smiting mist. It is surely worth while, gazing in the direction of this gleam of analogy and fact, to ask whether there have been cases in which the human form, under the highest activity of conscience, has been lifted aloft. I do not ask you to accept Mr. Crookes's statements. I ask you only to note what some portions of the very latest science are saying and to keep an eye on the lee shore, meanwhile taking soundings every now and then. Keep well away from the rocks of Spiritualism. There are maelstroms in which—listening, it may be, to evil spirits—man sometimes mistakes the moral downward for the moral upward; and, gazing into the azure of the wide, swift, smooth, circling sea at the whirlpool's eige until dizzy, persuades himself that its inverted reflection is the sky; wishing two wives, takes some gleam of a lie out of that lower azure as his justification for having them ; adopts the maelstrom, in all its downward swirls, for the upper heaven ; and so plunges into its glassy throat, as if he were ascending. Keep out of that.

Nevertheless, I cannot discuss the topic of uncontroverted physical facts concerning conscience without asking you to notice, in the name of Shakespeare and all the common instincts, on the one hand, and of all the latest research on the other, that a physical tendency to levitation is a matter worth investigation.

But now, my friends, even if we could not make any use of Mr. Crookes's facts, we do not know how tangible the moral law is. We know that these gestures upward and downward reveal subtle arrangements in the connection of our organization with conscience; that they indicate instincts; and that all instincts have their correlates. Suppose that I could take you no further up this staircase, along its twenty steps, than the tenth or fifteenth. Suppose that we cannot go up together over more than half these steps. You who stand on the lower platform will yet, when you look back, have an outlook worthy of study. I know that I have an instinct by which my gestures, in the midst of conscientious self-approval, express command, repose, elasticity; and that when conscience is against me I grovel naturally. Up and down are words physically proclaimed by natural law. There is no reversing the relations of the peerage of heaven. I want the culture that shall bring me near to the Court. I, therefore, must studiously examine the only steps by which man can ascend toward the Gates that have foundations. I know that pride and self-approval through conscience are as different as east and west. They are so far apart that east and west, compared with them, have nearness and cohesion. A reposeful mood and peace are given by a blissful supremacy of conscience; but these are rarely conscious of themselves, as pride always is. If the face has a solar light, usually it is unconscious of the possession of that radiance. And so, if a man have the approval of conscience, if the upper nature be in blissful supremacy, he is usually unconscious of his mood. No emotion has its full strength until it is so profound that its possession is not noticed by its owner. We are not fully given up to any feeling until we not only have possession of it, but become unconscious of the sorcery by which it possesses us. The orator must not only have possession of his subject, but his subject of him. When it has possession of him, you are not conscious of him, nor is he of himself, but only of his theme.

If I were able to go up only half the steps that you have ascended here with me, I should feel myself other than an orphan in the universe. We ask how God can be touched. How can we come near to the ineffable Somewhat and Someone, that lies behind natural law? We are poor flowers opening toward the moon. We have no eyes to see, and yet we have nerves to feel. Do we need anything more? We are sure we have the nerves and that we touch the sunlight. We know scientifically that there is an up and a down in natural law in the moral range. We are as conscious of this moral gravitation as we are of physical gravitation. We touch a Somewhat that lifts us, and the absence of which leaves us to sink to what appears to be a pit bottomless; and we know that this gravitation is a natural law. But it is a truth of science that every natural law is the constant operation of an Omnipresent Personal Will; and, therefore, in the incontrovertible physical facts illustrating moral gravitation as a natural law, have we not the touchings of the Personal Omnipresence, as much as the flower has the touchings of the sunlight when it absorbs its beams?

As feel the flowers the sun in heaven,  
 But sun and sunlight never see ;  
 So feel I Thee, O God, my God,  
 Thy dateless noontide hid from me.

As touch the buds the blessed rain,  
 But rain and rainbow never see ;  
 So touch I Thee in bliss or pain,  
 Thy far vast rainbow veiled from me.

Orion, moon, and sun and bow,  
 Amaze a sky unseen by me ;  
 God's wheeling heaven is there, I know,  
 Although its arch I cannot see.

In low estate, I, as the flower,  
 Have nerves to feel, not eyes to see ;  
 The subtlest in the conscience is  
 Thyself and that which toucheth Thee.

Forever it may be that I  
 More yet shall feel and shall not see ;  
 Above my soul thy Wholeness roll,  
 Not visibly, but tangibly.

But flaming heart to Rain and Ray,  
 Turn I in meekest loyalty ;  
 I breathe and move and live in Thee,  
 And drink the Ray I cannot see.

What of the Ascension ? It is said, to turn now one glance upon the Scriptural record, that One, whose face did shine as the sun in solar light, and who illustrated that radiance as no other member of the human race ever has done since, as he blessed his disciples, was lifted up from them, and a cloud received him out of their sight. Will you quail here when you see the perfect unity between the natural law, as I have endeavored to unfold it, and this action of the spiritual body, it may be, in that member of the human race, who, at the Transfiguration, illustrated the glorious capacities of that body for solar light ? I know that in *us* there is a levitating tendency in a moral trance. I know that as *we* pray the fashion of our countenance is altered. And it is recorded that as *He* prayed the fashion of his countenance was altered, and that as *He* blessed his disciples he was borne up from them. Without controversy, great is the mystery of Godliness ; God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory. You say that I am treading here upon the very edge of blasphemy, in assuming that any natural law is concerned in these summits of revealed fact. But, my friends, the distinction between the natural and the supernatural is one that may be stated in many ways. The natural to me is merely God's usual action ; the supernatural his unusual action. God's will is uniform ; and if you and I experience some tendency to stand erect when we are right with God, if you and I have some tendency to spiritual levitation

when we are in a moral trance, who shall say, if our goodness had equalled that of the Soul that never sinned, we should not know what levitation is, as he did?

I am perfectly aware that I am venturing into unexplored remainders of thought; but it is my purpose to do so, for here, at the Temple's opening in this structure which I am building, full of reverence for conscience, I wish to erect two pillars—two gorgeous marble shafts, if you please to look on them as I do, facts of science making them glorious—two columns, one on either side of the door—Solar Light and Moral Gravitation. Both are physical facts. Both we can touch in the lower flutings of the shafts, and we know by the argument of approach, and by the whole scheme of analogical reasoning, that if the solar light were carried up to its loftiest capacity, it might, at its summit, have the transfiguration; and if the laws of moral levitation are examined, and we ascend them to the highest point to which analogy can take us up, we may, without violating, by the breadth of a hair, scientific accuracy, find there the Ascension.

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## IV.

### MATTHEW ARNOLD'S VIEWS ON CONSCIENCE.

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IN 1786 Frederick the Great lay dying at Sans Souci; and in 1865 Thomas Carlyle, face to face with all the skepticism and doctrinal unrest and small philosophy of our time, and with a mind free as Boreas hored on the North Wind, sat down to describe the scene of Frederick's departure. This all-doubting man, Frederick, a pupil of Voltaire, seemed to have neither fear nor hope in death; but, says Carlyle, there was one kind of skepticism which he could never endure. "Atheism, truly, he could not abide. To him, as to all of us, it was flatly inconceivable that intellect, moral emotion, could have been put into him by an Entity that had none of its own."—"Life of Frederick," Vol. VI. last chapter.) Carlyle affirms that to *all* of us it is inconceivable, and this *flatly*, that evolution can exceed involution, or, that we can have intellect, emotion, conscience as the gifts of a power that has itself none of these to give.

You, remember, gentlemen, that Webster, when asked what his greatest thought was, looked about on the company at a crowded dinner-table, and asked: "Who are here?" "Only your friends." "The greatest thought that ever entered my mind was that of personal responsibility to a personal God." He expanded that idea in conversation for ten minutes, and rose and left the table. Men stood and sat in the hushed room, saying to each other: "Did you ever hear anything like that?" But yonder, on the shore of the sea, this same Webster, closing the greatest legal argument of his life—a document which I now hold in my hands—uttered the same thought in words that I have read standing on the coast there, and which have in them, whether read there or here, or anywhere on this lonely shore of existence which we call life, a giant swell like the roll of the Atlantic, an instinctive colossal tide found in every soul that is possessed of the full equipment of a man. "There is no evil that we cannot either face or flee from but the consciousness of duty disregarded. A sense of duty pursues us ever. It is omnipresent, like the Deity. If we take to ourselves the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, duty performed or duty violated is still with us for our happiness or our misery. If we say that darkness shall cover us, in the darkness, as in the light, our obligations are yet with us. We cannot escape their power nor fly from their presence. They are with us in this life, will be with us at its close, and, in that sense of inconceivable solemnity which lies yet further onward, we shall still find ourselves sur-

rounded by the consciousness of duty, to pain us wherever it has been violated and to console us so far as God has given us grace to perform it.”—(“Webster’s Works,” Vol. VI., p. 105.)

Flatly inconceivable that moral emotion, intellect can have been put into us by a being that has none of its own! But Matthew Arnold says that neither this inconceivability nor anything else shows that God is a person. It is a physical fact that Matthew Arnold’s upper forehead is very flat. Here are Carlyle, Frederick the Great, Webster, and I might put with them Cicero, Plato, Aristotle, Hamilton, Kant, Richter. Indeed, the latter says, speaking from experience and for men of his own natural rank, that the summit of every full-orbed nature suggests the belief in God as a person. At the top of the great hills in Italy we commonly find chapels. Richter affirms (Titan) that in the heights of every fully endowed man there is an instinct of obligation or sense of responsibility which points to a personal God. So Schleirmacher said, and built a renowned and, to-day, victorious system of religious thought upon the assertion. But he was a theologian. So Kant taught in his theory of the practical reason; and German philosophy at the present hour, however shy of some of his out-works, dares build nowhere else than on his fundamental principles. But he was an ethical philosopher. Take only literary men, take lawyers, take historians, take philosophers of no school in ethics, and as a general and very revelatory rule, wherever they have been full-orbed they have found in the depths of their endowments this deepest instinct—a sense of obligation, a feeling of dependence.

“Below the surface stream, shallow and light,  
Of what we say we feel; below the stream,  
As light, of what we think we feel, there flows,  
With noiseless current strong, obscure, and deep,  
The central stream of what we feel indeed.”

A highly important question in our vexed time is whether we are to take for our general guides men possessing the full range of natural endowments, or fragments of men, brilliant, indeed, in parts of the human equipment, but lacking several things that go to make up a full-orbed man. I am not here to assail any person as naturally unequipped; but we are most of us fragments, and Mr. Arnold admits, and his critics have always insisted, that among his limitations is a great deficiency of metaphysical insight. “Men of philosophical talents will remind us of the truths of mathematics,” says Matthew Arnold himself, “and tell us that the three angles of a triangle are undoubtedly equal to two right angles; yet very likely, from want of skill or practice in abstract reasoning, *we cannot see the force of this proposition* and it may simply have no meaning for us. The proposition is a deduction from certain elementary truths, and the deduction is too long or too hard for us to follow; or, at any rate, we may have not followed it or we may have forgotten it, and, therefore we do not feel the force of the proposition.” “Here it is, we suppose, that one’s want of talent for abstract reasoning makes itself so lamentably felt.”—(“God and the Bible,” pp. 68, 70. London, 1875.) “Probably this limited character of our doubting

arose from our want of philosophy and philosophic principles, which is so notorious and which is so often and so uncharitably cast in our teeth."—(*Ibid.* 1, p. 62.) "We are so notoriously deficient in talents for metaphysical speculation and abtruse reasoning that our adversaries often taunt us with it, and have held us up to public ridicule, as being without a system of philosophy based on principles interdependent, subordinate and coherent."—("Literature and Dogma," p. 389. London, fourth edition, 1874.) Matthew Arnold admits that all metaphysics are to him "the science of non-naturals."—("God and the Bible," p. 50.) But by metaphysics we understand here, as people do elsewhere, the science of self-evident truth, a systematic statement of axioms, with inferences that all men must draw from them, if they are only true to the self-evident propositions, which all admit. Metaphysics may, indeed, be so treated as to be obscure ; but metaphysics rightly treated is the luminous and exact science of self-evident truth. Matthew Arnold flaunts it as a science of non-naturals, and because some proof of the existence of God is drawn from metaphysics he will have nothing to do with any conclusion that stands on this pedestal—an abstract, all in the air, as he calls it.

Incontrovertibly we do not stand on anything that rests in the air when we stand on this eradicable human instinct which belongs to every full-orbed nature—a feeling of dependence, a feeling of obligation. That is a part of us. We are so made that we cannot doubt our finiteness. We are not everywhere ; we do not possess all power. There are limitations of our being. But we have an idea of the infinite. We are circumscribed, and we have an idea of a Being who is not. We do not comprehend him, but we apprehend him. As individuals we began to be. There is evidence that our race began to be. Once man was not on the globe ; he came into existence. Whatever begins to be must have a cause. We cannot suppose that the infinite has come forth from the finite. We, the caused finite, must be the work of the infinite. In loyalty to self-evident truth, we must put the finite in the relation of effect, and the infinite in the relation of cause ; and so we begin to feel sure, in the name of all clearness of thought, that we can intellectually justify this instructive sense of dependence.

There is an Eternal Power, not ourselves, on whom we are dependent ; this is, indeed Arnold's central thought. Nothing is more beautiful in his writings than the steady melody of one chord in his harp. Most of the chords are too short, or twisted, or unduly strained ; but there is one note in Matthew Arnold which has a divine resonance, and that is his passionate perception and proclamation of the natural victoriousness of right under the laws of the universe. Everywhere he is the prophet of a Power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness ; and this central assertion of his he regards as a truth of absolute science. He cannot decide whether the power is personal or not. He will not deny that it is a person. The Edinburgh *Review* says to him: "All existing things must be persons or things. Persons are superior to things. Do you mean to call God a thing ?" Matthew Arnold replies: "We neither affirm God to be a person nor to be a thing. We are not at all in a position to affirm

God to be the one or the other. All we can really say of our object of thought is that it *operates*.—"God and the Bible," pp. 97, 98.) There is in the universe an Eternal Power which makes for righteousness. We know this, as we know that fire burns by putting our hands into it. It is not necessary to decide whether it is or is not a person. I know by its operation on me, by its power in universal history, by the instincts which point it out, by my sense of personal dependence and obligation, that it makes for righteousness.

Standing now on this common ground, I wish to lead you up the heights which rise from it; and whether Matthew Arnold accompany us or not, I know that others will—the Kants and the Schleirmachers and the Richters and the Ciceros, the Platos and the Carlyles, and even the Fredericks the Great. And thus, if we go up without Matthew Arnold, we shall not go up in bad company.

1. Conscience emphasizes the word *ought*.
2. That word expresses the natural, human, instinctive sense of obligation to moral law.
3. It is everywhere admitted that this law was not enacted, and that it is not reversible by the human will.
4. It is imposed on us by an authority outside of ourselves.
5. Our obligation is, therefore, to an authority outside of ourselves.
6. *Our instinct of obligation is active even when we are separated from all human government and society.*
7. *We cannot imagine ourselves to obliterate the distinction between right and wrong even by the obliteration of all finite beings and of all immaterial nature.*

I can imagine the putting out of all the fires of all the hosts of Heaven. I can imagine that all finite being here and in the Unseen Holy is not. But I cannot suppose that the putting out of existence of all finite being would obliterate the distinction between upper and under, between the whole and a part, between a cause and an effect, or between right and wrong. The difference between the right hand and left would yet inhere in the very nature of things were all finite existence swept out of the universe. It would yet be true that there cannot be a before without an after, that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and that there is a difference between a whole and a part and between right and wrong. These propositions are self-evident truths, and depend for their validity not on the existence of the archangels, or of the government of the United States, or of Magna Charta, or of the human race. They are revelations of the laws of the nature of things, existing before Rome was founded, and, as Cicero used to say, likely to retain their authority when all human empires have been swept away. It is a very strategic point that I am elaborating; but I believe, now that I ask you to judge for yourselves, that I carry your general assent in asserting that we may imagine the annihilation of all finite existence, and yet, after that, have the existence of a distinction between the whole and a part, between a cause and an effect, and between right and wrong. This latter distinction, however, is only another name for the moral law; and so Webster

is right. The sense of duty pursues us ever. Even when these visible heavens are rolled away, the constellations remain and pursue their accustomed courses in the invisible heavens, that never shall be rolled away.

8. On examination of personal consciousness, it is found, therefore, that this authority to which we owe obligation is not immaterial nature, not the human race, not human government and society, nor infinite being in general.

All these things we can imagine annihilated, and yet our sense of duty pursues us ever. The feeling of obligation—that is, of the difference between right and wrong, and that the right ought to be chosen and that the wrong ought not—continues to follow us.

9. We know through conscience that we must answer for what we are and for what we do to a Power outside of us.

10. *In the very nature of things, moral obligation to answer for ourselves to a Power not ourselves can be owed only to a Power that knows what we are and what we do and what we ought to do; who approves of the right and disapproves of the wrong; and who has the power and purpose to punish or reward us according to our character and conduct.*

11. Such being the facts of our moral nature, we are under the necessity of assuming the existence of such a Being or Power, by whatever name we call it.

12. Such a Being or Power, who knows what we are and what we do, and what we ought to be and do, and who approves of the right and disapproves of the wrong, and who has the power and purpose to punish or reward us according to our character and conduct—such a Being or Power is a personal God, on whom we are dependent and to whom we owe obligation.

This is the argument by which Kant and Hamilton, while denying the validity of all other arguments for the existence of God, are forced to admit that our nature compels us to believe that he is and that he is a Person. Probably this argument, which convinces scholars more than any other, is the one which convinces the mass of men more effectively than any other form of reasoning from our inmost instincts.

Some men hold—and I will say nothing against their reputation for scholarship—that the existence of God is an intuition, or that we know that he exists just as we know that every change must have a cause, or that a whole is greater than a part. I, as you are already aware, do not hold that the divine existence is guaranteed to us by intuition. It is evident, but not self-evident. It is guaranteed to us by a single step of inference, from our deepest, surest, most ineradicable instincts. When I analyze these, I find the fact of God's existence, as a Person, lying capsule, wrapped up in the sense of dependence and of obligation, which *are* intuitions. I am just as sure that I am a dependent being as I am that two and two make four. I am just as sure that I owe obligation to what ought to be as I am that a whole is greater than a part.

The difference between right and wrong in our intentions or motives—those two words meaning the same things in this connection—you will find to be not

only evident but self-evident. You will allow me, here and now, since I did not say the divine existence is guaranteed to us by intuition, to affirm that the distinction between right and wrong is thus guaranteed. That there is a distinction between right and wrong is beyond all controversy, just as it is beyond all controversy that the whole is greater than a part. One of these assertions is as self-evident as the other. When we perceive this distinction between intentions we feel that we ought to obey a good motive and disobey a bad. Thus our sense of obligation expressed by the word *ought* is guaranteed by intuition, as well as by instinct. Intuition stands on one side of it and instinct on the other. The feeling that we ought to obey the right motive in the instinct; the perception of the right motive is the intuition. Conscience perceives the distinction between right and wrong motives, and feels that the right ought to be followed and that the wrong ought not to be. Thus intuition and organic instinct, the two highest authorities known to man, guarantee to us this sense of dependence and this sense of obligation. In the study of Conscience we stand between two pillars on which all surely rests, and, looking upward along the flutings of these two shafts of intuition and instinct—perception of the difference between right and wrong in motives, and feeling that the right ought to be followed, and that the wrong ought not—we can throw an arch from the capital of one shaft to that of the other, and on its summit, the sense of dependence on the one side and the sense of obligation on the other, we place upon the keystone the lowermost corner of the house not built with hands, the belief in a personal God, to whom we owe that obligation and on whom we are thus dependent.

If you will not examine self evident truths as a science, I must ask you to take the point of view of the microscope. Here is another line of thought proceeding out of the very heart of Biology:

2. Some force forms the parts in an embryo.

"We are woven," even Tyndall says, "by a power not ourselves."

On the first of October, at the Midland Institute, Professor Tyndall gave to the world knowledge of a secret which most scholars have understood for ten years. At the Midland Institute in that city of Birmingham which is so well known to you, sir (turning to the Rev. Dr. Dale, of England), Professor Tyndall said to the robber, the ravisher, and the murderer: "You offend because you cannot help offending." (Report in London *Times* of Tyndall's Lecture of October 1st.) Haeckel, the master of both Tyndall and Huxley, affirmed years ago, in his "History of Creation" (Vol. 1, p. 237), that "the will is never free." Some of you have thought it extravagant to assert that this same teaching lies between the lines of many a page published by the English materialistic school. Haeckel is a far bolder man than any of his followers, and he has proclaimed pointedly that the will is never free; and now Tyndall does the same. With much grace, with high literary ability, and with all the prestige of his great name, Professor Tyndall says to the murderer: "You offend because you cannot help offending; we punish you because we cannot help punishing." Approbation and disapprobation he would no more have as to the overflow of the muddy torrent we call an Iago or a Mephistopheles than he would for the over-

flow of the Rhine or the Mississippi. According to his scheme of thought, we may put up dykes against Caligula and Nero as we do against the Mississippi; but we are not to have disapprobation for Caligula, or for Nero, or for Catiline, any more than for the Tiber when it overflows its banks into the marble temples of Rome. We must say to the criminal: "You offend because you cannot help offending." These are Tyndall's own words, which Hermann Lotze would think hardly worthy of a reply. They are not more penetratingly mischievous than violently unscientific.

But even Tyndall asserts that we are woven by something not ourselves.—(Lecture at Birmingham, October 1st.) Now, I affirm that when the embryo comes into existence some force forms its parts. The force that forms the parts is the cause of the form of the parts. The cause must exist before the effect. We are sure of that, are we not? My delicious and surprising friends, who are sure of nothing, except that you are sure you are sure of nothing, thereby contradicting yourselves, are you not certain that a cause must exist before a change can be produced? Very well; here I stand with the process of the weaving of a physical organism going on under my microscope. Here is woven a lion, there a man; here an oak, there a palm. From the first the plan of each is in the embryo from which each begins. That plan must have been in existence before any physical organization exists in the embryo. Even your Haeckel says. (*Popular Science Monthly*, October, 1877, article on *Bathybius*, p. 652) that "life is not a result of organization, but *vice versa*." It is demonstrable under the microscope that life is the cause of organization, and not organization the cause of life. The plan must be in existence before it is executed. A plan in existence and not executed is a thought. The plan executed in the weaving of an organism, therefore, was a thought before the organism was woven. That thought exists before the organism. But thought implies a thinker. There cannot be a thought without a thinker. The thought executed in the organism does not belong to the organism. The design is not in the thing designed. It is outside the thing designed. The cause is outside of the effect. Thought, the force that forms the embryo, is not in the embryo. It is outside the embryo, for it exists before the embryo. Talk as you please about force being inherent in all matter, or of the tree Igdrasil, as Tyndall has lately said, being the proper symbol of the universe, we know that the cause must exist before the change it produces. This plan by which the form of the embryo is determined must be in existence somewhere before any form is woven. The first stroke of the shuttle, as we have proved, implies a plan; and we know that there is in the universe a thought not ourselves and not our own. Adhere to that proposition, and use Descartes's great argument—I think, therefore I am a person.

2. Since we are woven by a power not ourselves, there is thought in the universe not our own.
3. There cannot be thought without a thinker.
4. Therefore, there is in the universe a Thinker not ourselves.

5. But a thinker is a person.

To put now the whole argument from design into the shape which best pleased John Stuart Mill, we may say:

1. Every change must have an adequate cause.

2. My coming into existence as a mind, free will, and conscience, was a change.

3. That change requires a cause adequate to account for the existence of mind, free-will, and conscience.

4. Involution must equal evolution.

5. Only mind, free-will, and conscience in the cause, therefore, are sufficient to account for mind, free-will, and conscience in the change.

6. The cause, therefore, possessed mind, free-will, and conscience.

7. The union of mind, free-will, and conscience in any being constitutes personality in that being.

8. The cause, therefore, which brought me into existence as a mind, free-will, and conscience, was a person.

If you will look at that list of propositions, you will find nothing taken for granted in them except that every change must have an adequate cause. These propositions were emphatically indorsed after being read twice by the acutest intellect I ever met in theological science. I suppose them to be substantially the ground on which established science stands to this hour, with the Richters and the Carlyles and Platos and Aristotles and even with the all-doubting Fredericks.

We may say, also, in presenting further the argument from design

1. If there is an omnipresent, self-existing, and infinitely holy moral law, and if the nature of all independent intelligence has been adapted to that law, there must be a Moral Designer to account for this moral adaptation.

2. There are such a law and such an adaptation.

3. There is therefore, a Moral Designer.

4. But a moral designer must possess mind, free-will, and conscience.

5. The union of mind, free-will, and conscience in any being constitutes personality in that being.

6. The Moral Designer of the moral law is, therefore, a person.

John Stuart Mill advised all who would prove the Divine existence to adhere to the argument from design. Even Matthew Arnold says that all he can say against the argument from design is that he has had no experience in world building. "We know from experience that men make watches and bees make honeycombs. We do not know from experience that a Creator of all things makes ears and buds."—"God and the Bible," pp. 102, 103.) What if Red Cloud and Chief Joseph had been brought to the Centennial or to Washington? What if they had seen the majestic dome of our national capitol and all the marvels of the Centennial? Red Cloud would have said, if he had followed Matthew Arnold's philosophy: "I have had experience in building wigwams. I know the path from my house to the hut of Seven Thunders or Bear Paw. I know that every such path is made by some cause. I know that every wig-

wam must have been built by some man. But this railroad—I never had experience in building railroads—I do not know but that it was fished out of the sea. This marble Capitol, these wonderful and strange things in the Centennial! I have never had any experience in making columbiads or spinning-jennies. I know that the flint which I sharpen for my arrow must be shaped by some man ; but this columbiad, I do not know but that it grew. This pinning-jenny ! I have had no experience in factories and weaving-machines, and these marvels. I think this loom was *evolved*!"

I do not in the slightest degree misrepresent the reasoning of Mr. Arnold ; for the only objection he has to the argument from design is that he has had no experience in world building. David Hume also once made that assertion ; but when he walked with Adam Ferguson on the heights of Edinburgh one night, he said: "Adam, there is a God." Stuart Mill admits that the argument from design proves the existence of a designer; but whether we can prove that the designer thus proved to exist is the only designer in the universe is, as some people think, yet left in doubt. Paley's argument is supposed to be overthrown. A watch implies a watchmaker ; but how do we know that there was not a designer of the watchmaker, or that there is not a second God that designed the first God, and a third that designed the second, and so on? A design must have had a designer, and the designer a designer, and this designer a designer ; for every design is to have a designer !

Do not suppose that I am here to dodge this difficulty, although occasionally it may be that some of our theological teachers have done so. I have heard that Lyman Beecher was once approached by his students with the question how they should answer skeptics who told them that the argument from design proved too much. "They say to us," the students told their teacher, "that there may be twenty gods ; for every design must have a designer, and every designer a designer, and so on." Now, Lyman Beecher did not know how to answer that difficulty ; or, at least, he did not give the scientific answer. But he was quick, and so he said to his students: "These men say there are twenty Gods?" "Yes." "Well, you tell them that if there is one God it will go hard with them, and if there are twenty it will go harder yet." But the answer is this : That we cannot have a dependent existence without an independent or a self-existent being to depend upon. All existence, to put the argument in syllogistic form, is either dependent or independent. You are sure of that ? Yes. Well, if there is a dependent existence there must be an independent ; for there cannot be dependence without something to depend upon, and an infinite series of links receding forever is an effect without a cause. Your axiom that every change must have an adequate cause is denied by the theory of an infinite series. You carry up your chain link after link, and there is nothing to hang the last link upon.

1. All possible existence is either dependent or independent.

2. If there is dependent existence, there must be independent existence, for there cannot be dependence without dependence on something. An endless chain without a point of support is an effect without a cause ; dependence without independence is a contradiction in terms.

3. I am a dependent existence,  
4. Therefore, there is independent existence.  
But independent existence is self-existence.

1. All possible being is either self-existent or not self-existent.  
2. If there is being which is not self-existent, the principle that every change must have an adequate cause requires that there should exist being that is self-existent.

3. I am a being that is not self-existent.  
4. Therefore, there is being that is self-existent.

So, too, with exact loyalty to self-evident truth, we may say:

1. All possible persons are either self-existent or not self-existent.  
2. If there exist a person that is not self-existent, there must be a person that is self-existent.

3. I am a person not self-existent.  
4. Therefore, there is a person who is self-existent. It is He.

In these arguments nothing is assumed but self-evident truths, which all men act upon in business and take as certain at the fireside. The deep human instincts of conscience proclaim all that our metaphysics do. Science, standing upon axioms, knows no more at last than the man full-orbed who allows every tide in him to rise according to untaught instinct, and finds that when he swells aloft, under the natural attraction felt by the sense of obligation and dependence, he touches the stars. If you are a thin brook ; if you are under the torrid sun of skepticism ; if there are no great waves in you that kiss the heavens at times, you may be in doubt. But let your nature feel all that can come to you from the winds, and from the springs and from the search of the depths ; and then, when the Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness, rides the waves, you will find that the highest instincts in you touch him far aloft, as a Person.

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## V.

ORGANIC INSTINCTS IN CONSCIENCE.

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PLATO used to say that a ship is all but its wood. The eloquent shaft on Bunker Hill, yonder, is not fully analyzed by us when we take into view only its granite. The various parts put together exhibit a plan ; but all the parts, taken separately and without that plan, are not the monument. The parts of any mechanism without their plan are not equal to the whole. Here is the human eye, or ear, or hand ; and each contains more than the sum of all its visible parts. We know that the eye consists of several distinct portions. And when these and their collocations are examined separately, we find that they have only one thing in common—namely, the fitness to produce, when each part is co-ordinate with the rest, the organ of sight. We have lenses ; we have aqueous and vitreous humours ; we have eyelashes ; we have the iris ; we have the miraculous retina ; and, if these were seen in separation from each other we might at first be unable to find any similarity between them. The retina is not like the crystalline lenses. The substance of which the iris is composed is in great part very different from that of which the lashes consist, nevertheless, when we study the parts more minutely, we find that they have one thing in common—an adaptation to be a part of a multiplex whole, constituting an organ of sight. Now, that common element in them all *is* something, if you please. It must not be overlooked by the scientific method. There exists, undeniably, a common element in all the parts of the eye and in their collocations, and it must have had an adequate cause. When all the parts are put together, they constitute an organ of sight ; but that sight itself does not spring up until the parts are put together. If the shape of any one part be changed materially, or its collocations altered, sight ceases or is impaired. Every part has such a relation to the whole that each harmonizes with all the rest in an adaptation to produce an organ of sight ; and so we feel sure that the adequate cause of that adaptation must have had in view sight, as the result of this one common element in all the portions of the eye. The only adequate cause is something that intended to produce sight as the end of the process which brought into existence these parts and their arrangement.

Whether the parts came together by evolution or by special creation ; whether God's will operated through unchanging laws to produce the eye, or whether it produced the eye by a special act ; or whether no God at all was concerned in the case, we know that somewhere this adaptation of each part to

make up the whole mechanism must have had a sufficient cause. Even John Stuart Mill, sceptic as he was on many points, admits explicitly that we cannot explain the adaptation of part to part in the eye without supposing that the Idea of sight goes before the adaptation of these pieces to each other in such a manner as to produce sight. There must be an idea before we can have a plan ; and here an idea plainly existed before the effects it produces. The effects are the various parts of the eye, their co-ordination and sight ; but sight starts up only at the end of a long process. The idea must have been in existence somewhere when the adaptation of piece to piece was secured. That idea we prove to exist, not by analogy merely, but by induction. "This," Mill says, in his last book, ("Three Essays on Religion," American edition, pp. 171, 172), "I conceive to be a legitimate inductive inference. Sight, being a fact not precedent, but subsequent to the putting together of the organic structure of the eye, can only be connected with the production of that structure in the character of a final, not an efficient cause. That is, it is not sight itself, but an antecedent Idea of it, that must be the efficient cause. But this at once marks the origin as proceeding from an intelligent will." This logician makes this last stupendous concession because he knows very well that there cannot be an Idea without a Mind to contain it. There cannot be a thought without a thinker, any more than there can be an upper without an under, a before without an after, a here without a there. Reasoning, therefore, upon the strictest principles of inductive logic, applying all the tests of the scientific method, Stuart Mill's conclusion is that an antecedent Idea of sight must be the cause of sight, and that this idea must have existed in a Being possessing an intelligent will.

Herbert Spencer very inexcusably mistakes the force of such reasoning as this of Mill's, and calls it the carpenter theory of the Universe. Spencer's own scheme of thought, involving implicitly, as Haeckel's does explicitly, the assertion that organisms have come into existence by spontaneous generation or fortuitous concourse of atoms, shaken about like dies in a dicer's box, I call the dicer's theory. For one, I prefer the carpenter theory to the dicer's theory ; but I hold neither the one nor the other. Mill discusses the dicer's theory, and is of course, candid enough to admit that "this principle does not pretend to account for the *commencement* of sensation, or of animal or vegetable life." He weighs all his syllables, and commits his himself and philosophical reputation in the last year of his life to the proposition that "it must be allowed that the adaptations in Nature afford a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence."—("Three Essays on Religion," p. 174.) "The number of instances [of such adaptation] is immeasurably greater than is, by the principles of inductive logic, required for the exclusion of a random concurrence of independent clauses, or, speaking technically, for the elimination of chance."—(*Ibid.*, p. 171.) Thus Herbert Spencer failed to convert the last of the world's great logicians to the dicer's theory, so dear to all the materialistic schools of thought. Scientific theism holds neither the carpenter theory nor the dicer's theory of the origin of the Universe ; but asserts Goethe's proposition :

“ Who of the living seeks to know and tell,  
 Strives first the living Spirit to expel ;  
 He has in hand the *separate parts* alone,  
 But lacks the spirit-bond that makes them one.”

It is the supreme principle of Herbert Spencer's philosophy as well as of Sir William Hamilton's, that anything we cannot help believing or any proposition of which the opposite is utterly inconceivable, we must hold to be true. This has been the fundamental principle of every philosopher worthy of the name since Aristotle. Utter inconceivability, I claim, inheres in the proposition that this adaptation of part to part in the eye can be produced without the preceding idea of sight. Utter inconceivability lies behind all atheistic thought. So, too, it lies behind all thought which does not deny that God exists, but denies that we can know that he does. This agnostic theory never makes a scientific use of axioms ; it denies the power that inheres in necessary beliefs ; asserts, with Spencer, that we must consider as true our necessary beliefs ; and then, with him, denies that these beliefs carry us out to the idea of a Person.

Thus far I have endeavoured to lead you through this lecture, as through the last, over the ground of Induction, based upon Intuition. But, to turn now to the ground occupied by the great Organic Instincts of Conscience, it is not uncommon to find even materialism admitting that men instinctively think of God as Personal. It is often conceded that our instinct points that way ; but we are assured that our instincts mislead us. We have been miseducated. There are lying faculties in us. Our profoundest tendencies raise false expectations. It is on this verge of the wildest kind of scepticism, on this edge of what the books call Pyrrhonism, on this border of the denial of all self-evident truth, that I wish to call pause to-day for a moment, in the name of the axioms of science.

Here is the best book in the scientific method that has been produced since the death of Sir William Hamilton. You will all allow me to say that the “ Principles of Science,” by Prof. Stanley Jevons, is a standard work ; but he closes his hundreds of pages, filled with the most careful anyalsis of logical forms, with these very incisive sentences :

“ Among the most unquestionable rules of scientific method is that first law, that whatever phenomenon is, is. We must ignore no existence whatever ; we may variously interpret or explain its meaning and origin ; but if a phenomenon does exist, it demands some kind of an explanation. If men do act, feel, and live as if they were not merely the brief products of a casual conjunction of atoms, but the instruments of a far-reaching purpose, are we to record all other phenomena and pass over these ? We investigate the instincts of the ant and the bee and the beaver, and discover that they are led by an inscrutable agency to work toward a distant purpose. Let us be faithful to our scientific method, and investigate also those instincts of the human mind by which man is led to work as if the approval of a Higher Being were the aim of life.”—(Jevons, Prof. W. Stanley, of University College, London, “ The Principles of Science ; a Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method,” pp. 469. London, 1874.

Here speaks no theologian, no partisan, not even an anti-evolutionist, as every man of sense ought to be. Sneers about the carpenter theory, from one who thinks the dicer's the better, are quite out of place, face to face with that majestic peroration of Jevons. Let us be everywhere mercilessly true to the

scientific method. Since man does possess instincts by which he is led to act as if the approval of a Higher Being were the end of life, we are to investigate these instincts, at least, as searchingly as we do those of the bee, the ant and the beaver.

1. Instinct is an exhibition of intelligence *in* but not *of* the being to which the instinct belongs.

Your bee builds according to mathematical rule ; but do you suppose that all the intelligence it exhibits is in an intellect possessed by that insect ? Has it planned, has it thought out geometrical problems, at last ascertained in what method to construct the honey comb ? None of us believe that. We hold that the bee works by instinct, and the difference between instinct and reason is very broad. Instinct never improves its works ; but reason does. The bird builds her nest now as she did before the Flood, and the honey-comb is the same to-day as it was in the carcass of the lion when Samson went down to Jordan. Instinct copies itself and no more. It builds better than it knows. But Somewhat knows how well it builds.

Somewhat knows, did I say ? What a contradiction it is to affirm that Somewhat knows ? Somewhat does not know anything. Somewhat is nobody. You all admit, with Matthew Arnold, that behind conscience there is a Somewhat ; but you ask whether behind the Somewhat there is a Someone. When Matthew Arnold says that an Eternal Power not ourselves loves righteousness, he is introducing surreptitiously the idea of a Someone behind the Somewhat. Someone loves ; Someone may fight intelligently for righteousness ; but Somewhat never does or can love. The Eternal Somewhat who loves righteousness ! Self-contradictions pervade the most characteristic phrases of Arnold. He constantly introduces the idea of some one in his citations of biblical language and in his own sometimes very happy phrases. They are happy chiefly because they conceal and effectively use under the cloak of rhetoric the very ideas he opposes. The Someone he will not name explicitly. He asserts the existence of a Somewhat ; but he will not admit the existence of a Someone except surreptitiously, using the idea, though not confessing its existence. Assuredly, if we are to follow Mill in this examination of the eye, with which I opened our discussion, we must suppose that the idea of the honeycomb exists before the honeycomb, as the idea of the eye goes before the eye. The idea must have existed somewhere before the plan of these structures existed. Somewhere there must have been an adequate cause of the adaptation of part to part in the honeycomb.

Almost imperceptible creatures in the sea build in the Indian Ocean a goblet. It is called Neptune's cup. Sometimes it has a height of six feet and a breadth of three. It is erected solely by myriads of polypi—fragile animals shrunk within their holes and only half issuing, in order to plunge their microscopically small arms into the waves. One of these creatures struggling to keep its position on some reef, made by the graves of its predecessors, begins to build, without any consultation with its swarming mates. They all build, and they fashion little by little the base of the goblet. They then carry up the long,

slender stem. They have no consultation with each other in their homes there under the sea. Each works in a separate cell; each is as much cut off from communication with every other as an inmate of a cell in the wards of Charles-town Prison yonder is from his associates. They build the stem to the proper height and then they begin to widen it. They enlarge it and commence the construction of the sides of the cup. They have no communication with each other. They build up the sides leaving a hollow within. Everything proceeds according to a Plan. You have first the pedestal, then the stem, then the widened flange of the goblet, then the hollow within, looking up to Heaven. The savage passes, and gazes on Neptune's cup in the Indian Ocean, and is struck with reverence. He says in his secret thought: These creatures cannot speak with each other; but they act on a plan, as if they were all in a conspiracy to produce just this Neptune's cup. Is the plan theirs, or does it belong to a Power above them and that acts through them? Your poor savage there on the foaming coast of the Tropics looks up to the same sky into which the cup gazes, and finds the author of the form of that Neptune's goblet in a Power not of, but in the creatures which build it. It is in them, but not of them, for they have no intellect which can conceive what the goblet is, but in isolation from each other they so build their cells that they produce at last a structure having a plan held in view, not only apparently, but in fact, from the very first. Even your foremost French materialists find themselves dazed when they stand where this savage does. One of their opponents, writing lately, affirms that Neptune's cup is the noblest challenge that can be thrown down before the materialistic evolution.—(Prouchet, "The Universe," pp. 59-61.) And yet we have men so filled not with the depth of the sea of thought, but with its mere froth; so filled with what even the coral insects might rebuke—disloyalty to instinct—that when they stand before Neptune's cup they see nothing to wonder at. But just as these isolated creatures build Neptune's cup, so the bioplasts, isolated from each other in the living tissues which they produce, build the rose and the violet and all flowers, the pomegranate and the cedar, the oak and the palm and all trees, the eagle and all birds, the lion and all animals, the human brain and all men. It is absolutely necessary that the builders of Neptune's cup should be governed by one dominant idea. Does chemistry explain the origin of their common thought? It is also absolutely necessary that all the bioplasts that weave any living organism should be governed by one idea, and that idea differs with the differences of individual living forms. Does chemistry explain the origin of that co-ordinating thought? Neptune's cup alone strikes us dumb. But what shall we say of the mystic structures built by the bioplasts? There is the cup. It is a fact. And the eye is another Neptune's cup; and the hand another Neptune's cup; and all the universe is another Neptune's cup; and out of such cups I, for one, drink the glad wine of Theism.

2. The instincts of the bee, the beaver, the migrating bird are found, when scientifically investigated, to raise no false expectations. They all have their correlates; they are never created to be mocked.

3. From the existence of the profound instincts of Conscience we must infer that they, too, when scientifically interpreted, raise no false expectations.

4. But it is conceded that there are instincts in the human mind by which man is led to work as if the approval of a Higher Being were the aim of life.

5. This instinct involves a consciousness of God as not merely a Somewhat, but also a Someone.

It is not to be supposed that any scientific line fathoms the depths of the nature of the Someone or of the Somewhat, revealed in the instincts of Conscience. But the quality of an infinity we may know even when we cannot know its *quantity*. Knowledge does not cease to be knowledge by becoming Omnipotence. Power does not cease to be power by becoming Omnipotence. Space does not cease to be space by becoming infinite in extent. Time is time, although you stretch it out to the infinities and the eternities. Intellect does not cease to be intellect by becoming infinite. The seat of intellect! That was Paley's definition of personality. We have no better definition than that. Wherever we have a thinker, we know, therefore, that there exists a person. Ideas flame from all quarters of the universe; plans appear in all the Neptune's cups along the coast of the upper Indian oceans yonder, in the sounding surf of the constellations where the starry dust of the nebula floats as spray. We find there a plan and here a plan. And wherever a plan we find an idea; wherever an idea, a thought; wherever a thought, a thinker, a person; and, so if you say all has been evolved, we say, of necessity, that all has been produced by an Evolver.

6. It is conceded everywhere that Conscience forebodes punishment and anticipates reward.

7. Those activities of Conscience which forebode punishment and anticipate reward involve a consciousness of God as personal. The sense of obligation and the sense of dependence both involve a consciousness of God as personal.

There are organic and instinctive activities of Conscience by which we forebode punishment or anticipate reward. Who denies this? Not Nero when he stabs himself, or causes his servant to hold the sword on which he falls. Not Nero when he hears groans from the grave of his mother, whom he murdered the other day, at Baiae. Tacitus says, as I recollect at this moment, that Nero, after he murdered Agrippina, heard *sonitum tubæ planctusque e tumulo*—the sound of a trumpet and groans from her grave. He had had no Christian education. He had not been brought up wrongly, and probably did not feel, as Hume did, that it was necessary to explain his qualms of conscience by a shock he received in his youth. Nero had an education drawn out of the black sky and the blood-soaked sods of old Rome; and yet he anticipated the action of the Furies behind the veil. Who will stand here and affirm that these instincts which in all ages have expressed themselves in what all religions have taught to the Furies and Nemesis and the Avenging Fates, and as to what awaits us in time to come beyond death, are not expressions of an organic and ineradic-

able instinct in the man? If God makes an instinct, there is always something to match it. The instinct of the migrating bird finds a South to match it; an ear, sound to match it; a fin, water to match it. We walk directly out upon this universal organic possession of man and infer the existence of the other side of it. The poor bee throws out its antennæ and touches things near it; and Conscience throws out her antennæ and touches things behind the veil. Conscience makes cowards of us all, not on account of anything this side the veil, but of something on the other side. But when Conscience makes cowards of us all, is it merely of some arrangement of the molecular atoms in the universe, merely of some shiver of the ultimate particles of this inert stuff that we call matter, merely of a Somewhat; or is it of a Someone that Conscience makes us afraid? I have yet to find a materialistic philosopher who does not admit that this foreboding organic instinct is human. This is the way conscience is made; and I undertake to say that it is not bunglingly and mendaciously made.

8. The good, the great, and the poetic minds of the race in all ages have described their highest experiences as involving a consciousness of God as personal.

Let your thoughts run through the vistas of historical precedents. Call up Socrates, with his protesting genius, that always told him what not to do; call up every great poet that has addressed the Muses; call up every orator that has invoked the aid of the gods; remember Demosthenes there on the Bema, looking abroad on the matchless landscape, the temples, the tombs of the men who fell at Salamis, and yet invoking, above them all, the immortal gods. Remember that no public state assembly was opened at Athens, in her best days, unless preceded by prayer. A dripping cloud would disperse an audience in the Pnyx, and that because men thought that this portent indicated that the gods were against their assembling. Votive tablets to Jupiter clothed the naked rock at the sides of the Bema. Even your Napoleon believes in a protecting genius. Lowell pictures the first man in his naturalness as God-conquered, with his face to Heaven upturned. In our highest moments we instinctively speak of a Someone, and not merely of a Somewhat. Richter says that when a child first witnesses a thunderstorm; when the greatest objects of Nature—such as the Alps, the Himalayas, or the ocean—come before the mind for the first time, then is the moment in which to speak of God; for the sublime everywhere awakens the thought, not only of a Somewhat, but of a Someone behind it. Not a Somewhat merely, but a Someone, walks on Niagara's watery rim. The further up you ascend the Alps, if your thoughts are awake, the more near you come to anticipated communion, not only with Somewhat, but with Someone higher than the Alps, or than the visible heavens that are to be rolled away. There are in the midnights on the ocean voices that the waves do not utter. I have paced to and fro on the deck of a steamer midway between England and America, and remembered that Greenland was on the north, and Africa and the Tropic Islands on the South, in the resounding seething dark, and my home behind me and the mother isle before me. Lying on the deck and looking into the topgallants, and watching them sway to and

fro from among the constellations, and listening to the roll of the great deep, I have given myself, I hope, some opportunity to study the voices of Nature there; but I assure you that my experience has been like that of every other traveler in the moments when the sublimities of the sea and the stars have spoken loudest. A Somewhat and a Someone greater than they spoke louder yet. The most audible word uttered in that midnight in the centre of the Atlantic was not concerning Africa or America or England, or the tumbling icebergs of the North; but of the Someone who holds all the immensities and the eternities in his palm as the small dust of the balance. Was that natural? Was it instinctive? Or was this mood a forced attitude of spirit; I should have thought I was not human if I had not had a tendency to such a mood. I should have been a stunted growth, I had almost said a lightning-smitten trunk, without the foliage that belongs to the upper faculties, without the sensitiveness that comes from the culture of one's whole nature, if I had not felt behind the Somewhat of the material globe the Someone giving it order.

9. In the deepest experiences of remorse there is a sense in the soul of a disapproval, not only by a Somewhat, but also by a Someone.

10. It is a fact of human nature that total submission of the will to conscience brings into the soul immediately a strange sense of the Divine approval and presence as personal.

Pardon me if I ask you to use the scientific method, gentlemen, in the verification of the most sublime fact of human nature. You turn upon the sky your unarranged telescope at random, and you see nothing. Direct it properly, but fail to arrange its lenses, and everything visible through the tube is blurred. But arrange the lenses, and bring the telescope upon the star, or upon the rising sun, and the instant there is perfect accord between the line of the axis of the tube and the line of the ray from the star, or the orb of day, that instant, but never before, the image of the star or sun starts up in the chamber of the instrument. Just so I claim it to be the fact of experience (if you doubt, will you try the scientific method of experiment on this subject?) that whenever we submit utterly, affectionately, irreversibly to the best we know—that is, to the innermost Holiest of Conscience—at that instant, and never before, there flashes through us, with quick, splendid, interior, unexpected illumination, a Power not ourselves. The image of the star or a representation of the sun is found within the chambers of the poor, feeble human instrument. You cannot have that inner witness until you have that exterior and interior conformity to conscience; but whoever has these will know by the inner light that God is with him in a sense utterly unknown before. The axis of the tube must be turned exactly upon the light before you can have the image. An utterly holy choice brings with it a Presence we dare not name. Turn conscience, in total self-surrender, gladly and exactly upon the Sun behind the sun, and it is a fact of science that there will inevitably spring into existence a Sun behind the lenses, hot enough to burn up your greed and fraud, hot enough to burn up your doubts and those winged creatures of night, scepticism and unrest, which fly through the twilight, and not through the noon.

So much as to conscience is known to be fixed natural law. There are, undoubtedly, in conscience unexplored remainders, both unknown and unfathomable to science. "Conscience and the consciousness of God," says Julius Muller, "are one." But if behind the uncontroverted facts as to the natural action of the highest of all human organic instincts there are mysteries, the scientific method, with unwavering finger and lips mute with awe, points out in what direction we are to seek their explanation.

"Careless seems the Omnipresent. History's pages but record  
One death-grapple in the darkness 'twixt old systems and the Word ;  
But the yet-veiled rules the future, and behind the dim Unknown  
Standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above his own."

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## VI.

### GEMS FROM JOSEPH COOK.

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MR. COOK's "preludes" to his Boston lectures are frequently as rich in practical as the lectures are in scientific truth. Here are a few of his gems:

#### COMMUNION WITH GOD.

Who are these skeptics who revere the scientific method and are unwilling to try experiment even once concerning this upper realm of truth? I assert that it is a fixed natural law that when you yield utterly to God he streams into you, gives you a new sense of His presence, and imparts a strength unknown before.

#### GOD IN THE HUMAN CONSCIENCE.

He who enters into the depths of his Conscience and there muses, pacing to and fro, is more likely to meet God and to understand the plan of the whole universe, physical as well as moral, than he who paces to and fro among the Seven Stars, or puts his hand upon the sword hilt of Orion, or flees with Cygnus across the meridian, or follows Bootes as he drives his hunting dogs over the zenith in a leash of sidereal fire.

#### THE ULTIMATE END, MORAL.

All the philosophy of Herman Lotze turns on the central principle that the ends of the universe are moral. This is the deepest ethical teaching of your Julius Muller, and of your Dorner, your Rothe and your Ulrici, that we never understand anything until we connect it with the moral purpose had in view by the Author of all things from the first.

#### A PERSONAL GOD, AND ETHICAL TENDENCY.

He who fastens his attention on the uppermost ranges of natural law will understand the lower, into which the upper sink down with supreme power. He who gazes only upon the planets will understand neither the planets nor the suns. Begin with the loftiest that is known to us; take the scientific method up into the constellations, which in all ages have had constant forms in the human in-

ner sky; study the sense of dependence and obligation which point to a Personal God; and, you will find that the universe has everywhere an ethical tendency; you will find that the ethical aim of all things is the justification of all things, and in conscience, will discover the Copernican system of moral heavens.

#### MANY AMONG THE MASSES ARE WILLING.

We are, I think, far under-rating the willingness of the rougher class in our large cities to hear Christian truth. We are far from meeting their hunger. The intensity of desire on the part of hundreds and hundreds who have given up hope to be encouraged, to be told that there is yet a prospect for them, although they have not where to lay their heads, is greater than you imagine. You do not go down into the lower strata of society. You sit before your fender; you toast your moccasins there; but if you would stain them a little in the gutter, and in the rough straw of the attics, and in the damp mire of the cellars, where more and more of our population in cities are living, you would find yourselves on the path followed by Him who went about from house to house doing good.

#### HOW TO REACH THEM—THE CHURCH WILLING.

I believe that nine out of ten of our churches are willing to see all ranks of society in God's house, and to measure them there only by the standard of religious character. When the classes that we wish to reach are not reached by the regular churches, and when they can be reached by tabernacles and Young Men's Christian Associations, when an audience of 5000 comes together in an open hall, can such an opportunity be innocently thrown away?

#### BRING THEM INTO TABERNACLES.

Twice the Tabernacle has been open this season, and twice it has been well filled. Hundreds go there who do not go to the regular churches. The unchurched masses are to be criticised for not being willing to go to established places of worship. Every church in America is the result of the voluntary system. We shall have, no doubt, luxurious churches in our luxurious age and time. But there will be and there are churches for the average labourer; churches glad to see anybody who is decently clad, and to give a good seat to the man who may be hungry and possibly not quite cleanly.

#### CAREFUL TEACHING—BE NOT TOO CRITICAL.

You say that the work done in Tabernacles and Young Men's Christian Associations is often superficial. Will you see to it that men are invited into activity in these places who have proper equipments? Some men say the wrong thing

technically, in their expression of religious truth, and yet make the right impression ; and some men say precisely the right thing—very martinets of language in theology—and make wrong impression.


#### CHRISTIAN UNION—AN ILLUSTRATION.

There is a Lord's table in the church, and when invitations to it are given, all denominations are brought together. To me, the Church is best represented by the union signified by that common invitation. We wander up and down the alcoves of the library yonder in the Athenæum. Sometimes we have a recess filled with books on Greece ; then another with books on Rome ; but all the recesses open into one hall. So the different denominations are but recesses in one vast temple ; they all open out into one great palace floor, up and down which, in stern times, when we really do our duty for the perishing and dangerous, our Lord walks, arm in arm, not with the Baptist, not with the Presbyterian, not with the Methodist, not with the Congregationalist, not with the Episcopalian, but with the whole Church, which is his living garment.

#### MOODY'S WORK.—MAJOR AND MINOR TRUTHS.

Is it not a matter of amazement that, when 5000 persons here in Boston have been brought to a resolution to do their duty, and a great part of them have united with the church, we should hear from the collegiate city of New Haven very little response, except the statement that Mr. Moody's views are not sound on the matter of the Second Advent ! I had known Mr. Moody two years before I knew what his views on the Second Advent were ; and, if his great usefulness continues, I shall know him twenty years longer before I care. Provided his devout effort is blessed of God, as it has been ; provided he is endowed from on high with the capacity to reach, through his tenderness of heart, through his marvelous practical sagacity, and through the activity that almost made him an invalid here in Boston, working until midnight, and carrying his labour through with a zeal that no man could understand who did not help in it ; provided he continues labour of that sort, I, for one, shall consider it an honour to Boston if she can help him a little and not criticise him at all. He is abundantly able to do without the appreciation of this city where, after all, he has been appreciated well, and where his work, I think, has been as remarkable as in any other city he ever visited.

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